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In the Nordic countries, we have increasingly witnessed a model of risk governance that 
outsources the issue of national security to municipalities and local governments. 
Municipalities are tasked with tackling radicalisation and violent extremism (RVE), of which 
they are equipped for to a varying degree. This has created the need for pooling of knowledge 
and competencies in the effort of preventing RVE. One way of pooling knowledge is through 
governance networks, which operate as a mode of risk governance. However, there is little 
knowledge of the value created in such governance networks. Thus, this research seeks to 
contribute to closing knowledge gap on how governance networks can contribute to 
prevention of RVE. This explorative study will add empirical meat to a skinny bone. 
The research examines the Nordic Safe Cities network, a governance network that operates 
with the aim of creating safer Nordic cities. This network has 20 member cities from across 
the Nordic countries, and offers advisory, webinars and knowledge exchange for the 
municipal coordinators. Through the theoretical framework of governance networks, the value 
added to local preventive efforts from this network will be examined.  
The key findings of this research validate much of the previous knowledge in the field when it 
comes to how a governance network should be structured in order to be facilitate members’ 
capacities in prevention work. It sees ten pillars as necessary for the success of a governance 
network; a governance network will facilitate members’ capacities in prevention of RVE if 
these pillars are in place. Nevertheless, the lack of evaluations seen in the empirical findings 
pose challenges to the model for success that this research presents. There is still a long way 
to go before knowing whether a successful governance network is the same an efficient one, 
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Radicalisation and violent extremism (RVE) have often been seen as global phenomena with 
local manifestations and have also been present in the usually peaceful Nordic countries.1 Some 
scholars have advocated for a common Nordic approach in security issues, as there “appears to 
be vast similarities, rooted in seemingly common robust social welfare systems, supported by 
transnational conceptual learning, and manifested in Nordic cooperation and agreements” 
(Larsson & Rhinard, 2021, p. 4). Despite there being differences between the Nordic countries 
it is these similarities that form the basis of this thesis – the cooperation between Nordic 
countries on societal security issues.  
The recent shift in how the Nordic countries tackle RVE, from a national issue handled by the 
nation state to a local issue needing to be undertaken by the communities, creates the need for 
competencies within the municipalities (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 2). There is 
now a more decentralised approach where local actors have increasing responsibi lities (Jore, 
2021, p. 180). This means that the Nordic municipalities need competencies and knowledge on 
radicalisation, violent extremism and how to prevent these. 
Nordic cities face varying degrees of radicalisation and violent extremism. These are not 
straight-forward phenomena. Yet, we expect both smaller and larger municipalities to handle 
these issues in order to maintain the safe, secure, and peaceful society we now live in. Are the 
municipalities equipped for this? How can a municipality with one or two people working on 
RVE ensure safety for all citizens in the community?  
Most public sector employees have at some point been part of some form of formal or informal 
network. This mode of governing has become increasingly popular in Europe. Thus, it i s 
necessary to know whether the time spent on such networks are worth the time and effort that 
is being put into the network, or whether it is just a fancy name on a wall that has no significant 
input. It is of importance as money is being pushed through these networks, thus needing to 
know if this is money well spent.  
Networks are not a new phenomenon, and networks on different topics and level has been a 
product of a more recent form of risk governance where local authorities are responsible for the 
safety and security of its citizens. In recent years we have seen an increase in cooperation and 
 
1 The five Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland are the countries included in this 
research. When talking of ‘the Nordics’, these are the countries in mind. 
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information sharing in the Nordic countries when it comes to RVE and how to solve these. We 
go to conferences, attend meetings and seminars, and we join networks on particular issues in 
order to increase our competence and knowledge. What are these networks worth? Are they 
just glossy images, nice web pages and success stories, or are they arenas for learning and 
information sharing? Are they a place for competence increases and value adds for the local 
communities as well as the practitioners? How can we assess the value of such networks? It is 
important to know what aspects of prevention work is fruitful and which means are not 
beneficial to the local coordinators on prevention work. 
It is of high importance to the academic field to figure out how efficient these networks are in 
the preventive work regarding radicalisation and violent extremism. If networks are an efficient 
means to reach safer cities, capacities can lie in the networks, as opposed to the cities. For 
smaller cities, this could be important as local capacities might be pressured and creating expert 
departments in each and every field of wicked problems in order to create safe cities will be 
both costly and demanding. Rather, if efficient networks can pool the most updated knowledge 
and research, each municipality will not need to create their own expert hubs; expert knowledge 
will be available for all communities facing similar problems. Hence, this research will examine 
how such networks can facilitate prevention of RVE.  
 
1.1 Contextualisation 
The issue of terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism has increasingly been given 
attention. The 9/11 attacks have become an anchoring event that drastically transformed 
peoples’ perception on terrorism due to its dramatic character (Nacos, 2019, p. 2). In the last 
two decades, attention surrounding radicalisation and violent extremism has increased 
dramatically both in volume and number of actors (Lid et al., 2016, p. 15). Recent events in the 
Nordic region, such as the 22nd July 2011 attacks in Norway, the 2015 Copenhagen shootings 
and the Bærum mosque attack in 2019 highlight the need for preventive measures (Sivenbring 
& Malmros, 2020, p. 11).   
This research is an explorative study which seeks to improve knowledge on how practitioners 
in the field operate in networks, and what they find useful about these networks. The thesis 
seeks more knowledge on whether networks and network organisations are a fruitful approach 
in preventive work. In order to do this, one network has been selected as the unit of analysis. 
The Nordic Safe Cities (NSC) network is a formal, membership-based network working on 
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RVE issues in the Nordic countries. This research will look into the theory of network 
governance and see this theory in light of the network analysed here. The empirical findings 
will add data to both the theory of network governance as well as how value can be added to 
local communities through this form of risk governance.  
 
1.1.1 Research on prevention efforts 
In the last two decades, attention surrounding RVE has increased dramatically both in volume 
and number of actors (Lid et al., 2016, p. 15). Since 9/11 there has been an increasing focus 
onto how and why certain people become radicalised and violent, also in the Nordic countries. 
There has been extensive research, albeit without clear results, onto why certain individuals 
become radicalised and/or violent extremists. A lot of the research focus on the reasons for 
radicalisation and the platforms for radicalisation (schools and prisons have been of particular 
interest).  
Research regarding prevention and countering of radicalisation and violent extremism (P/CVE) 
is still considered a small field of research despite the political focus gained by the topic. 
Network organisations as a means of risk governance for P/CVE work is an even narrower field 
of study with few articles consisting of empirical studies or empirical data. Additionally, lack 
of mutually agreed upon definitions of both radicalisation and violent extremism makes 
prevention complex and relatively unorganised despite efforts to review and establish a 
common ground of knowledge (i.e. Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2015) and Stephens et al. (2019)).  
Radicalisation and violent extremism take many shapes and forms. Right-wing extremism, left-
wing extremism and Islamic extremism are often studied separately and tackled differently 
(Carlsson, 2017, pp. 9-16). There is still a lot of research needed to be done on the field of 
radicalisation and violent extremism (RVE), which has consequences for the P/CVE field. 
Municipalities in all Nordic countries have in the last decades had increasing focus on P/CVE, 
although the threat of radicalisation and violent extremism is highly uneven spread out between 
the countries and municipalities. Thus, it is a bigger problem for some municipalities than for 
others (Carlsson, 2017, p. 21). Increasingly, local authorities and communities are expected to 
engage in prevention efforts (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 2). It is therefore 




Dalgaard-Nielsen and Haugstvedt (2020, p. 13) claim that Denmark and Norway have been 
among the frontrunners in local preventive efforts. Despite this, Lid and Heierstad (2016a, p. 
95) makes the claim that coordinators in the municipalities are not equipped for the task. 
Employees on all levels see challenges connected to the task that in the worst case could cost 
lives. This is cause for insecurity for both coordinators on the strategic level but also for the 
practitioners and front-line workers in fields that are expected to deal with such issues. This 
includes, social service workers, teachers, and the police.  
However, not all research on RVE is as dispersed as presented above. Social capital through 
stable trust-based relationships and networks among the actors of a community, including local 
authorities, have been emphasized in several studies. Indications have been made that local 
governments need a degree of freedom to test local solutions on a case-to-case basis, and the 
need to avoid one-size-fits-all seems clear (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016, pp. 311-319). 
Despite certain mutual indicators, knowing what efficient P/CVE efforts is seems an impossible 
task due to the wickedness of radicalisation and violent extremism.  
The policy field concerned with P/CVE in the Nordic countries is relatively new and is 
undergoing rapid incident driven development (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 24). National 
Action Plans to counter radicalisation and violent extremism are gaining momentum, yet little 
scientific knowledge on the topic hamper potentially beneficial P/CVE measures. Through an 
analysis of the Nordic Action Plans, Sivenbring and Malmros (2020, p. 25) concluded that the 
need for knowledge and more research is focused on seeking evidence for best practices as well 
as knowledge of how to identify and report vulnerable and suspicious individuals. It is in the 
former field this thesis wishes to add knowledge.  
 
1.1.2 Networks as a means of tackling radicalisation and violent extremism 
Networks are being created as part of the efforts of gathering information and sharing ideas in 
the common effort of P/CVE. Some networks exist internationally, amongst these are the 
Radicalization Awareness Network, the Strong Cities Network, and the NSC network 
(Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 106). Despite these networks being present and mentioned in 
multiple research papers, none have evaluated or assessed the effects of these networks on their 
members. Thus, little is known about the efficiency of such networks; their real contribution 
and effectiveness is largely unknown.  
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As P/CVE is a research field still in its infancy, there is little data to be found on the effect of 
networks that operate in the field. According to Dalgaard-Nielsen (2016, p. 137) trust-based 
networks are able to utilise useful resources such as pooling of knowledge and competencies. 
Hence, networks should present a beneficial opportunity to be an efficient work mode. These 
networks also allow for a centralisation of knowledge and scientific research. Thus, there is no 
need for each community to contain expertise in a field as one can seek out networks in the 
field that contribute with information and knowledge, which is seen as a precondition for 
successful action to prevent and reduce a complex and wicked problem, and the urgent need for 
systematic learning and evaluations has been argued (Carlsson, 2017, p. 18).  
Despite seemingly offering a more effective intervention to counter radicalisation and violent 
extremism than any other single government agency acting on its own, these governance 
networks, however, are no easy solution despite seemingly offering a more effective 
intervention to counter. As far as this research is concerned, no studies have been conducted 
that assess or evaluate the efficiency or effect that governance networks have in the field of 
P/CVE. Neither will this thesis offer an evaluation of the NSC network. Rather, this research 
seeks to close the knowledge gap on how governance networks increase their members’ 
capacities in preventive efforts. In essence, one step closer to evaluating the effect of such 
networks.  
 
1.1.3 Nordic collaborations in the P/CVE field 
Many aspects of the P/CVE approach in the Nordic countries are similar. Collaborative work 
between agencies is a model used in all of the Nordics (see figure 1), albeit in varying degrees 
and not widely used in Sweden (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 7). RVE present a challenge 
no single actor can handle on their own. Thus, new patterns of cooperation and preventive work 
are constantly developed as complex problems demand complex solutions (Lid & Heierstad, 
2016c, p. 176).  
Some researchers talk of a Nordic model, despite smaller differences in approach. One point 
important to note is the grave lack of scholarly information on Iceland. The Nordics are in many 
settings grouped together but there is a big knowledge gap on RVE and P/CVE knowledge in 
Iceland.  
Due to their long tradition of cooperation, there are many similarities in how the Nordic 
countries tackle the challenges RVE present. Despite smaller differences in how the Nordic 
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countries deal with P/CVE related issues, the Nordic governance model consisting of trust, 
tolerance, openness, and legitimacy is relatively similar (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 31). 
This makes for good possibilities in collaborative forums.  
1.1.3.1  The Nordic Safe Cities 
One of the Nordic collaborations in the P/CVE field is the NSC network. This is a Nordic 
organisation that aims to create safer cities, with safe public spaces (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020e), 
and is the unit of analysis in this research. This network consists of 20 Nordic cities from all of 
the Nordic countries (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020b). According to Høybråten (2017, p. 7), the 
network enables cooperation across borders and hope that good initiatives in various Nordic 
cities can serve as global inspiration.  
Despite arguing that no two cities are the same, Nordic Safe Cities (2017, p. 8) claim that the 
Nordic region and Nordic cities have a lot in common, which is in line with the scholarly view 
of the existence of a Nordic model of governance. Thus, making it possible to create a common 
Nordic approach. Both the Nordic P/CVE approach and the NSC network will be elaborated in 
the following chapter.  
 
1.2 Problem statement  
The problem statement was reached after seeing what gaps in the scientific knowledge 
presented a good opportunity for research. Thus, the overall theme of this thesis is whether  
networks are an efficient means of governing radicalisation and violent extremism. I wish to 
look into this topic through a problem statement. This problem statement will be answered by 
looking into one specific network, the NSC. I wish to look into what the cities gain from the 
network; whether they find motivation, ideas, or specific measures that they make use of. Is 
there value in the network for the practitioners, or the communities as a whole? The aim is to 
see whether this form of risk governance – governing the local preventive measures through 
formal networks – is an efficient way of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (RVE).  
 
The thesis will thus answer the following problem statement:  
How can governance networks facilitate members’ capacity to prevent radicalisation and 




In order to answer this problem statement, it is important to see first what a governance network 
is, then how a governance network operates and how a governance networks affects the praxis 
of its members. To clarify the problem statement further, when talking about the members, they 
will be referred to as: the members, the coordinators, the cities, or the municipalities 
interchangeably. It is, however, important to note that this refers to the active participants of 
the network, and not their communities as a whole. When mentioning societies or communities, 
the local citizens, or population, will be included in the meaning. The reason for this divide will 
be elaborated in chapter 5.2.  
Further, when the problem statement refers to facilitate, it will  be equated with an increase in 
capacity. This is due to the connotations of the word. If a governance network is facilitating a 
member, it is implicit that the work of the member becomes easier, or the capacities of the 
member is enhanced. Thus, these two concepts will be used interchangeably.  
This research uses the governance network Nordic Safe Cities as the unit of analysis to see how 
governance networks affect the members and their capacities to tackle RVE in the Nordic 
countries. There will also be an examination of the success factors for such a governance 
network. 
 
1.2.1 Delimitations  
The boundaries of this thesis are set by the unit of analysis that is the NSC network. This is the 
only network that will be examined in this research. The focus of this research will be on how 
the network is perceived by its members and the value add the network creates for the member 
cities.  
The various approaches to RVE set by the cities internally will fall outside the scope of this 
research. The focus in this research is on the strategic level, as the informants are all operating 
as city coordinators on P/CVE issues. Thus, the focus will remain on the strategic level and not 
go into detail on any of the P/CVE measures put in place by the municipalities. Neither will 
there be an evaluation of measures by the municipalities or an evaluation of the NSC network. 
The research emphasises certain factors that need to be in place for a successful network, and 
what these factors are, in order to answer the problem statement.  
The full extent of RVE issues cannot be tackled in this research alone. There are various types 
RVE, for example right-wing, left-wing and Islamist ideologies. Often these are seen as separate 
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phenomena. As the NSC focus on all of these there will not be specific mentions of how they 
are tackled separately. 
The reason for the change in RVE being increasingly seen as a local issue as opposed to one of 
national security will be outside of the scope of this research, despite this being of importance 
for the municipalities affected by this gradual rotation towards local prevention. Rather, the 
problem statement comes as a consequence of risk governance increasingly being seen as a 
local challenge rather than one of national security.  
 
1.3 Structure  
This thesis consists of six chapters where the first chapter introduces the previous research in 
the topic of study, as well as research this thesis is building on. This first chapter introduces the 
knowledge gaps the P/CVE field, thus the reason for choosing the problem statement.  
Chapter two introduces the theoretical framework the empirical data will be analysed through. 
This theory is gathered and combined for the purpose of this research. A preliminary model has 
been made for the purpose of this research, and I will present these pillars of success in a 
governance network in this chapter. The introduction and description of the NSC will also be 
done in this chapter.   
Chapter three takes the reader through the research design and method of study. This chapter 
shows the research process and reflects around decisions made throughout the process.  
Chapter four is the chapter of the key findings in this research, presented in the order of the 
pillars of success. In addition, two new pillars are added as a result of the empirical findings. 
The empirical data will be introduced in the chapter but discussed in the following discussion 
chapter.  
Chapter five is the discussion that gathers all lose ends between the above chapters. Here, the 
model on the pillars of success in a governance network will be discussed in relation to previous 
literature, the theoretical framework, and the key findings in this research.  
Lastly, the conclusion will summarise the discussion, and explicitly answer the problem 
statement in this research. This chapter will also look into the implications of this research, both 
practical and theoretical, as well as suggesting some topics of further research.   
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2.0 Theoretical framework 
The chapter will start by looking into some of the concepts used in this research. This will be 
done to clarify what is meant as several of the concepts have multiple meanings. In order to see 
whether the NSC network is an efficient network, it is important to see how the network 
operates. Therefore, the theory to be introduced will be network governance theory, then the 
NSC will be seen in relation to this theory. At the end of this chapter, an operationalisation of 
certain factors for success in governance networks will be presented. This operationalisation 
comes from an extensive literature review and gathering of documents in order to discover all 
plausible factors for efficiency in governance networks. Eight factors linked to successful 
governance networks will be provided. Accordingly, I have grouped eight pillars of governance 
networks together in a model for success.  
 
2.1 Conceptual clarification 
Some definitions and clarifications of how this research will use the concepts are necessary, as 
this research concerns itself with a network that operates in the field of RVE. Thus, it is 
important with a mutual understanding of the issues concerning in this thesis.  
 
2.1.1 Risk governance 
Governance is a concept used to refer to “the steering of society and the economy through 
collective action in accordance with common goals and standards” (Kenis, 2016, p. 156). Risk 
governance refers to governing of risk and risk-related areas. 
“Governing choices in modern societies is seen as an interplay between governmental 
institutions, economic forces and civil society actors, such as non-governmental 
organisations. At the global level, governance embodies a horizontally organised structure 
of functional self-regulation encompassing state and non-state actors bringing about 
collectively binding decisions without superior authority. In this perspective, non-state 
actors play an increasingly relevant role and become more important since they have 
decisive advantages of information and resources compared to single states” (Renn, 2008, 
p. 8).  
10 
 
Risk governance concerns itself with the complex mechanisms concerning how management 
decisions is made (Renn, 2008, p. 9). In essence, network governance is a method of doing risk 
governance. It is a way of undertaking issues at hand.  
 
2.1.2 Wicked problem 
RVE can be classified as wicked problems. Wicked problems are complex challenges that are 
difficult to solve, and where no effective solution exists. Their characterisations are blurry and 
the parameters of the problem are difficult to define. To complicate wicked problems further, 
they can also be symptoms of other problems and they are seen as highly interlinked 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p. 402). Common traits in wicked problems are that they contain 
multiple actors, often with divergent interests and values; situations are messy and uncertain; 
and academia is unclear and has little reliable knowledge.  
As a wicked problem has no solution, some researchers claim that learning across different 
perspectives, reaching a shared understanding of the nature of the problem, and developing 
better intervention capacities should be the focus (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 9). 
As the root of wicked problems is their unruly nature, reaching a shared global understanding 
of a particular wicked problem could be counterproductive. Nevertheless, in similar countries, 
such as the Nordics, a unified approach could be argued for as the countries are based on similar 
systems of government and governance (see chapter 2.1.8 for an introduction to the Nordic 
model).  
 
2.1.3 Terrorism/counterterrorism  
“It appears that terrorism, radicalisation and extremism have increasingly become 
merged into a single discursive framework” (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 12) . 
The focus of this thesis is radicalisation and extremism but in order to understand these two 
concepts it is important to see them in relation to the umbrella term they sometimes fall under, 
namely terrorism. The issue of terrorism is not new to society. The phenomenon has existed for 
centuries and has always caused fear due to its dramatic and sudden character (Nacos, 2019, p. 
4). Terrorism is not an easy concept to define, and there is no agreed upon definition. However, 
some traits are less controversial than others, and that is that terrorism is violence, or the threat 
of violence, and that it is committed to intimidate a population (Lindahl, 2017, p. 527; Nacos, 
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2019, pp. 24-29; Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 12). Counterterrorism is, thus, the measures 
taken to prevent terrorist attacks. It is the strategies and tactics adopted in response to terrorism 
(Nacos, 2019, p. 282).  
The general understanding seems to be that radicalisation and extremism precedes terrorism 
(Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 11). In addition, Jore (2021, p. 179) states that it is now 
viewed that “terrorism can be prevented by focusing on radicalisation”, showing that terrorism 
and radicalisation is tightly linked and the focus on radicalisation is currently part of 
counterterrorism strategy.  The current approach also highlights the importance of preventive 
work; It could save lives.  
 
2.1.4 Radicalisation 
As with all challenges that fall under the wicked problems umbrella, radicalisation is a contested 
term that has no one accepted definition. Nevertheless, some similarities between definitions 
exist and a much used, relatively wide, definition of radicalisation is:  
“a social process through which an individual or group of individuals adopt extremist 
views” (Nehlsen et al., 2020, p. 3).  
This, or similar, definition has been used by several researchers, and there is consensus in the 
research community that radicalisation is a process that occurs over time (Dalgaard-Nielsen & 
Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6). Despite some definitions of radicalisation being narrower, only 
focusing on certain groups being radicalised, this definition encompasses the phenomenon that 
can be seen in Nordic cities. Sivenbring and Malmros (2020, p. 21), however, claim that there 
exists confusion between practitioners in Scandinavian municipalities and the research field. 
Municipalities have seen radicalisation as a static outcome and/or political or religious position. 
This is not in line with the definition presented above. Hence, the lack of unified definition 
complicates local preventive efforts.  
The definition does not say anything about how or why some people become radicalised. One 
issue facing researchers in this field is the lack of knowledge of the root causes of radicalisation. 
There is no unanimity as to what the problem or the solution might be (Lid & Heierstad, 2016c, 
p. 175). However, the dominating understanding of the causes of radicalisation is similar to the 
understanding of other social concerns such as addiction, crime, and other behavioural issues. 
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Amongst the believed root causes of these problems are exclusion in arenas such as the labour 
market and education, as well as social exclusion (Lid & Heierstad, 2016a, p. 97).  
 
2.1.5 Extremism and violent extremism 
“Extremism…usually refers to broader ideological and political milieus, specific 
organisations and individuals that have attitudes, values, ideas, norms and behaviours 
that, in comparison with the majority political and religious mainstream norms, are 
viewed as extreme” (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 13).  
In short, extremism can be seen as rejection of democracy and human rights, whereas 
justification of the use of violence for political goals can be classified as violent extremism 
(Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 13). Some claim that individuals seeking extremist milieus 
find themselves not fitting in, whether it is in school, in the workplace, or in society (Nordic 
Safe Cities, 2017, p. 11). This is similar to the view of the causes of radicalisation and the claim 
to causes of extremism has been disputed with the argument that no single cause can be found 
as to why some people chose to become extremists.  
The boundaries between extremism and violent extremism are fluid but one definition of violent 
extremism is: “using, threatening with, instigating, encouraging or justifying violence based on 
ideological grounds” (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020b).  
 
2.1.6 The complexity of radicalisation and violent extremism 
The phenomena of RVE are closely linked to the issue of terrorism. Some researchers claim the 
difference to be that terrorism is an act of violent extremism and radicalisation is the process 
that makes someone a violent extremist and/or terrorist (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, pp. 14-16; 
Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, pp. 11-14). Consequently, these phenomena are tightly linked 
and, in many cases, cannot be separated. However, the linkage between these phenomena is not 
as simple as presented above. Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2015, pp. 14-17) claim that violent 
extremism ranges across more violent phenomena than terrorism, such as violent 
demonstrations, vandalism, or participation in civil war. However, they also suggest that 
persons can be radicalised without ever becoming violent extremists.  
Sivenbring and Malmros (2020, p. 11) claim that making direct causal links between terrorism 
and radicalisation, and extremism and radicalisation is a misconception. Some people will have 
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radicalised opinions without acting violent, and some may be violent extremists before 
becoming radicalised (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, p. 16).  
In other words, radicalisation can occur without engagement in violent extremist or terrorist 
actions. The concepts are tightly linked but there is not necessarily linearity between becoming 
radicalised towards conducting a terrorist attack. The practical implications of this is that 
P/CVE can also be seen as counterterrorism despite the process potentially never leading to a 
terrorist act. Hence, the distinction between these concepts is highly unclear. 
The issue of how to tackle these interconnected phenomena then appears. “In the prevention 
field, it is rather widely acknowledged that there are at least two main approaches to handling 
the problem. One is security measures, the other is social preventive measures” (Sivenbring & 
Malmros, 2020, p. 18). This research has this in mind when it looks into how networks are used 
to tackle wicked problems. The Nordic mode of prevention is often viewed as focusing on the 
social preventive measures.  
 
2.1.7 Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism  
As stated above, RVE are separate phenomena even though they are tightly linked. There are 
no clear definitions of measures to prevent or counter radicalisation and violent extremism, and 
it has become synonymous with numerous safeguarding measures, from early prevention to 
targeted measures for violent extremists (Gielen, 2019, p. 1153). Hence, prevention of 
radicalisation and violent extremism is “an umbrella term for strategies and approaches that aim 
to prevent or mitigate radicalisation and/or extremism” (Nehlsen et al., 2020, p. 3).  
Some authors separate between prevention of violent extremism (PVE) and countering violent 
extremism (CVE), where PVE are the early preventive measures and CVE are measures more 
related to deterring those already radicalised (Davies, 2018, p. 4). This distinction is not clear 
and concise, and many authors use CVE and PVE interchangeably. Some use either CVE or 
PVE to cover both the early preventive measures and the direct deterrence of already radicalised 
individuals. P/CVE measures do not only aim to include individuals and milieus in positive 
processes but also to protect citizens from extremist violence and terror attacks (Lid & 
Heierstad, 2016b, p. 35). The abbreviation P/CVE will cover both prevention and countering 
measures. In this acronym radicalisation seems overlooked. The reason behind this is unclear, 
but for the purpose of this research P/CVE will include early measures and deterrence of 
individuals in the process of radicalisation. Thus, covering all aspects of the preventive work. 
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In other words, P/CVE will be seen as the term for strategies and approaches that aim to prevent, 
counter, or mitigate radicalisation and violent extremism.  
 
2.1.7.1 Backfire processes 
One issue in P/CVE work is the possibility of backfire processes, which is the unintentional 
increasing of the risk whilst attempting to mitigate the very risk (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 340). In 
trying to tackle RVE issues, there is the risk of increasing the problem through P/CVE 
measures. However, little research exists on these processes, how and why they occur. Backfire 
processes is of relevance as it has increasingly been seen in relation to P/CVE work. It will be 
used to refer to the perversion of effects from P/CVE measures leading to an increased risk of 
RVE (Lindekilde, 2016, p. 52).  
 
2.1.8 The Nordic Model 
There is much debate about whether there exists a Nordic model in prevention of radicalisation 
and violent extremism. In welfare and democracy studies there is much talk of a Nordic model. 
Similarities between the Nordic countries in labour, economic policy, education, culture and 
state media has been emphasised in these studies (Larsson & Rhinard, 2021, p. 6). As part of 
this Nordic welfare model is a perspective on criminal prevention as inclusion in the civil 
society through work, education, and housing. This also appears to be the approach on P/CVE 
issues (Lid & Heierstad, 2016a, p. 97).  
In addition to a long tradition of cooperation between the Nordic countries, the Nordic model 
of democracy emphasises “a state and government that provides protection from physical and 
social risks, fundamental freedom for all, mutual respect, trust and equality under the law” 
(Nordic Safe Cities, 2020b). These societal similarities allow for thinking that prevention of 
radicalisation and violent extremism could be similar in these countries. It is still important to 
note that similar approaches are not the same as identical approaches. 
The Nordic model can thus be transferred to the field of P/CVE, as the Nordic countries’ focus 
on “early prevention initiatives that promote social cohesion, democratic values and resilient 
communities with a particular focus on vulnerable youth” (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020b). This can 
be seen in the cross-sectoral prevention approach which includes work in schools, social 
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services and the police, such as the Danish SSP model2 that has spread to Sweden, Norway and 
Finland, albeit with minor adjustments and local adaptations (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 
31). Building positive relationships with communities and young people have been emphasised 
as the recommended practice in the P/CVE praxis (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 139).  
The Nordic prevention model is one classified as a multiagency approach which means that “no 
single actor or agency has the knowledge, information or operational space” to tackle the 
subject on their own, for example are both police, schools and social services working on the 
same concerns with a collaborative approach (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020, p. 30). 
Consequently, needing several societal agencies in order to tackle RVE issues.  
The figure below highlights the similarities and differences in the Nordic countries’ regarding 
what appears to be the focus area of the prevention approach: 
 
 
2 SSP is short for Schools, Social Services and Police, which means that the SSP model is one of collaboration 
between these agencies. In short, it is the name of the multiagency approach to P/CVE work in the Nordics. For 
more information on this approach, see: Sivenbring, J., & Malmros, R. A. (2020). Mixing Logics. Multiagency 

















Figure 1 Figure adapted from Sivenbring and Malmros (2020, p. 138) 
 
Despite smaller differences in definitions, frameworks, and underlying assumptions, the four 
Nordic countries3 show similar types of operative structures in the fields (Kotajoki, 2018, p. 
18).  
Sivenbring and Malmros (2020, p. 31) claim that this multiagency approach rests on core tenets 
of the Nordic governance model, namely legitimacy and mutual trust, despite smaller 
differences due to some variations in the pre-existing structures in the Nordic countries.  
 
2.2 Network governance theory 
In order to know how a governance network can facilitate P/CVE capacities in Nordic cities, it 
is important to know what a governance network is and how they operate.  
Network governance theory has mushroomed in the last three decades/since the 1990s (Fawcett 
& Daugbjerg, 2012, p. 195; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a, p. 3). As a response to changes and 
challenges in society, network governance represents a social or communal form of organising 
society in which trust, reciprocity and the pursuit of mutual benefit interact to forge jointly 
agreed and achieved outcomes (Keast, 2016, p. 442). As mentioned, I see network governance 
as a mode of risk governance.  
In all simplicity network governance theory is the governing of public goods and spheres using 
cooperation through networks to solve issues and problems facing society. The concepts of 
networks and governance have been seen as “notoriously slippery terms” (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2007a, p. 9). Generally speaking, networks are seen as actors bound by mutual interaction, and 
governance refers to the steering of society through collective action (Kenis, 2016, pp. 152-
156). This process can be both formal and informal (Sørensen, 2016, p. 420). Hence, network 
governance is:  
“A movement of politics and administration towards being intertwined in various forms 
of interactive networks which in many cases are not prescribed by constitutions, legal 
 




frameworks or statutes. Network governance is neither market nor government nor civil 
society, it is a hybrid organisational form” (Bogason & Zølner, 2007, p. 5). 
In other words, network governance is the means of tackling societal security issues through 
formal networks of interaction and information sharing. This view of network governance fits 
well with the description of the NSC and encompasses several other networks that the results 
in this thesis can also cover.  
Some authors use the concept network governance, and others consistently talk about 
governance networks. In many cases they talk about the same phenomenon, and in some cases, 
they mean different things. Network governance is here seen as the overall theory. Governance 
networks will be used to refer to the specific networks that fit into the theory of network 
governance; the particular form of network within a particular form of governance (Sørensen 
& Torfing, 2007a, p. 9).  
 
2.2.1 Network governance and P/CVE issues 
Network governance in the field of wicked problems, such as P/CVE issues, can be seen as a 
recent phenomenon. Some authors have argued that New Public Management4 is the reason 
behind the proliferation of praxis. Top-down governing is losing its grip and being replaced by 
pluralistic governance based on interdependence and trust (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a, p. 3). 
Dalgaard-Nielsen (2016, p. 135) argues for the need to de-emphasise central government at the 
advantage of networks and collaborations that includes local government and civil society. A 
network is more likely to possess the necessary resources and expertise and is therefore a better 
solution to the complex challenge that is P/CVE. This is also a trend that has been followed in 
the Nordic countries, where local governments are increasingly responsible for tackling RVE, 
which was previously seen as a matter of national security and the nation state (Dalgaard-
Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 2).  
Wicked problems, such as RVE, need a transboundary risk governance approach that seeks to 
bring actors and stakeholders together, strengthening cooperation and enhancing horizontal 
learning (Noordegraaf et al., 2017, p. 392). Networks such as the NSC should therefore in 
theory be a sensible governing mode in order to facilitate P/CVE efforts.  
 
4 The increasing marketisation, privatisation and outsourcing of public services that has occurred in the last few 




2.2.2 Governance networks and efficiency 
Efficiency is a slippery term, and here an effective governance network is defined as “the 
attainment of positive work-level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual 
organisational participants acting independently” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 2).  
Networks are seen as an efficient way of tackling wicked problems as resources from a range 
of different providers and interest groups can be pooled together (Blanco et al., 2011, p. 301). 
Regardless of the competencies of the local actors, a network will in many cases expand the 
knowledge and competency in order to effectively intervene to counter RVE (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2016, p. 137). Sørensen (2016, p. 421) argues that there is scholarly agreement that the “pooling 
of knowledge, resources and competencies, the possibility for mutual learning and the ability 
to coordinate the actions of social and political actors in the process of implementation” can 
contribute to a more effective and efficient public governance. It has also been argued that in 
order to be effective, some degree of internal commitment from members must be maintained 
(Peters, 2007, pp. 74-75).  
According to Torfing (2016, p. 3), governance networks “bring together relevant and affected 
actors with different ideas, skills, and resources”. In some cases , the governance networks will 
be separate actors directly involved with P/CVE measures, whereas the network relevant in this 
research is a governance network that connects the academia, or research field, to the P/CVE 
coordinators in the cities. The importance of governance networks can be claimed to lay in the 
increased collaborative learning process that may lead to innovation in public policy or P/CVE 
measures (Torfing, 2016, p. 3).  
According to Torfing (2016, p. 9), researchers argue that the “combination of flexibility and 
authority in governance networks will tend to enhance effective governance” and has also 
claimed that “despite the lack of transparency and accountability in governance networks, their 
contribution to the enhancement of empowered participation, public deliberation, and 
democratic legitimacy tends to have a democratising effect on society and public governance”.  
 
2.2.2.1 Efficient governance network = network management 
Complexity in governance networks as shown above has created a need for certain amounts of 
organisation, guidance, and management of interactions. This has led to the emergence of 
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network management (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p. 5). Some authors believe that attempts to 
manage networks is futile and contrary to the idea of governance (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012, 
p. 197). Others see this as a way of maximising efficiency (Blanco et al., 2011, p. 302). 
Governance networks that take a network management style are seen as “interorganisational 
arenas for interest mediation between self-interested actors who interact because of the presence 
of a mutual resource dependency” (Torfing, 2016, p. 20).  
A network management facilitates interactions, explores new content, and organises 
interactions between actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p. 5). Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 8) 
brands this Network Administrative Organisation (NAO), where there is a separate 
administration to govern the network. The administration can consist of one or several people 
who coordinate and sustain the network. Research has shown that intensive network 
management strategies have caused better performance, as perceived by respondents, compared 
to networks with fewer managerial strategies (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p. 7). Thus, this far it 
can be seen that a successful governance network is an efficient one.  
 
2.3 The Nordic Safe Cities as a governance network 
This part of the chapter will see the NSC in terms of the network governance theory presented 
above. Here, the NSC will be seen as a governance network despite minor deviations from the 
theoretical framework.  
The NSC was initiated by the Nordic Council of ministers in 2016, in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attack in Copenhagen in 2015 (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020e). Since then it has become 
an independent non-profit, non-governmental organisation, an NGO (Kelk, 2020). It is a non-
profit organisation run by a secretariat with its offices in Copenhagen (Nordic Safe Cities, 
2021). With its 5 employees, the organisation consists of a secretariat in charge of organising 
activities for the member cities in the network. Two have been part of the organisation since its 
birth (executive director and deputy director), and the others have joined in 2020 and 2021. The 
NSC secretariat also work with partners and partner organisation to enable the cities access to 
the most recent research in the field and best practices from other Nordic cities (Nordic Safe 
Cities, 2021). There are eight ‘safe city advisors’ connected to the network, who work on a 
contract basis, and also hold positions as professors, researchers at universities or science 
institutes, or work in the field of RVE. From the partner organisation there is a range from local 
stakeholder organisations to research centres (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020d).  
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With the aim to create “local safety in the Nordic cities”, “has its origins in and primary focus 
on the prevention of extremism”, and “make the Nordics a global pioneer region in the 
prevention of extremist violence and hate”, the NSC alliance work to share information and 
best practices with its 20 member cities (Nordic Safe Cities, 2021). 
The NSC network’s vision emphasise trust in addition to Nordic values of democracy, equality 
and mutual respect, as important factors for the network (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020e).  They see 
violent extremism in the Nordic countries as a societal challenge as much as it is a security 
matter. Thus, seeking the underlying causes of radicalisation and violent extremism (Nordic 
Safe Cities, 2020b). The NSC network calls itself a ‘thinkubator’ that helps member cities create 
“safe cities, stand against the rise of polarisation and safe-guard citizens from extremist violence 
and hate” (Nordic Safe Cities, 2020a).  
The network takes an advisory role to create individual strategies for its members (Nordic Safe 
Cities, 2020e). Through advisory, summits and various initiatives the NSC network seek to 
share knowledge and best practices amongst the Nordic cities to develop policies and practical 
solutions. The network enables meetings across cities and departments, as well as meet ings 
where the most recent knowledge in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism is shared 
(Nordic Safe Cities, 2020a, 2021).  
According to the NSC network they: 
“Function as an advisor to reinforce existing strategies or concepts, and as an 
entrepreneur to shape and launch new pilot concepts. We further aim to compare the 
metrics and success criteria, experiences and results across the cities when dealing with 
similar challenges. This will hopefully give us an opportunity to compare the outcome 
and impact of the work done in and with the cities and share and scale ‘what works’” 
(Nordic Safe Cities, 2020c).  
Membership in the network is voluntary and costs DKK 75,000 annually (Nordic Safe Cities, 
2021). A city commits to a minimum of two years of membership which allows for tailored and 
adapted approaches (Nordic Safe Cities, 2021). This membership is for all members up for 
renewal ahead of 2022, as the network started 2020 with the new organisational structure as an 
NGO independent of the Nordic Council of Ministers.  
As have been shown above, governance networks have been increasingly important as a mode 
of governance in the Nordics. The NSC have several of the traits seen in this literature and a 
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summary of these traits can be seen in Table 1 below. These traits, or characteristics, are not 
examined in detail, and are not to be confused with the factors of success but are shortly 
mentioned in order to see the similarities and differences between the NSC and governance 
networks as seen from the theoretical framework on network governance.  
 
Network traits Governance networks Nordic Safe Cities 
Hierarchy Non-hierarchical Non-hierarchical 
Interactions Across public, semi-public, 
and private 
Semi-public, and private 
Regulation Self-regulating Self-regulating 
Purpose Contribute to public purpose Safety of citizens 
Competency Pooling of knowledge, 
coordinate resources 
Pooling of knowledge 




Structure Complex and potentially 
chaotic, territorial anchor, 
range from informal to formal 
Organised through a 
secretariat/network 
management – formal structure 
Policy making Create routines for policy 
making 
Policy making is not an aim in 
itself. Strive to provide better 
knowledge for the cities on 
P/CVE issues 
Vision Change is incremental Four aims: information, 
connecting, advisory and 
innovation 
Trust Trust is critical Trust is important 
Communication Interactive – knowledge 
exchange/dialogue 
Interactive – knowledge 
exchange 
Dependence Interdependent between 
network actors 
Dependent on membership 
fees, the Nordic Council of 




Goals Mutual goals Safer cities  
Membership Various degrees of autonomy Membership-based but 
autonomous cities 
Table 1 The Nordic Safe Cities as a governance network, theoretical framework adapted from Bevir and Rhodes (2007); Blanco 
et al. (2011); Hertting (2007); Keast (2016); Sørensen (2016); Sørensen and Torfing (2007a, 2007b). 
 
As seen in the table above, the NSC network in many ways fit the characteristics of a 
governance network with a network management (a NAO), and will therefore be seen in the 
context of this form of risk governance. Nevertheless, the matching of characteristics is not an 
indication of the performance of a governance network, and it is important to see this form of 
governance in relation to whether or not it facilitates P/CVE efforts. For this to be seen, the 
characteristics need to provide value for the network.  
 
2.4 Pillars of success in a governance network 
As we have seen above, the NSC can by its characteristics be seen as a NAO governance 
network. However, in order to see whether a NAO form of governance network, such as the 
NSC, contribute to prevention of RVE, it is important to know how it is considered successful, 
in the sense that a successful governance network also implies that it is efficient: 
“NAO  network governance will be most effective for achieving network-level 
outcomes when trust is moderately to widely shared among network participants 
(moderate density trust), when there are a moderate number to many network 
participants, when network-level goal consensus is moderately high, and when the need 
for network level competencies is high” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 13).  
These three factors, trust, goal consensus and need for competencies are seen by Provan and 
Kenis (2008). Nonetheless, these are not the only authors who have found factors that could be 
relevant for the success of a governance network. Through an extensive literature review, eight 
pillars stand out as important for the success of governance networks. For the purpose of this 
research, the eight factors that have been chosen, have all been seen in the light of the structure 
of a NAO governance network. These eight pillars have been gathered in the table below (table 
2) and show the findings in previous literature on the topic.  
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Some studies have in the last two decades made progress when it comes to seeing efficiency in 
governance networks. Efforts have been made towards finding commonalities and factors for 
success of a governance network. Whether success in a NAO is the same as an efficient NAO 
will be discussed in chapter five but as far as previous research is concerned, these two concepts 
(success and efficiency) are overlapping. Following is eight pillars, or factors, that point 
towards the success of governance networks: trust, size, managerial activity, need for 
competence, goal consensus, legitimacy, learning and innovation, and stakeholder involvement.   
 
Pillars of success Previous literature 
Trust The higher degree of trust the better for the governance 
network. This leads to predictable interactions and 
possibilities for showing vulnerabilities.  
Managerial activity A high activity level is important, variety of contacts 
needed and acting as facilitator is vital.   
Need for competence Gathering experts and scientists, as well as stakeholders 
and competencies is important.  
Goal consensus Goals tend to be fluid, unclear when the goal is reached 
but goal consensus should be high. 
Learning and innovation Individual and collective learning is important. 
Deliberation is important, and so is the degree of 
diversity or homophily. Size and centralisation of the 
network could also contribute or hinder learning.  
Size A larger network is more resilient but the bigger the 
network the more complex the interactions.   
Legitimacy Often considered a-constitutional but can also connect 
civil society and civil society organisations to avoid this.  
Stakeholder involvement Stakeholder involvement raises the quality. This also 
relates to legitimacy.  





For many researchers, trust seems to be an important common denominator in networks, in 
addition to resources and expertise. Klijn and Koppenjan (2012, p. 7) argue that trust is often 
seen as the core coordination mechanism of networks despite it being a rare occurrence. Thus, 
trust affects network performance as trust reduces uncertainties and increases information 
sharing and exploration of new solutions.  
Trust is seen as an important part of a governance network. There are several reasons for this, 
and Edelenbos et al. (2011, pp. 436-438) shows that trust both leads to more predictable 
interactions, as well as making actors more inclined to being vulnerable. One important 
conclusion on the efficiency of governance networks is that it is not the intensity of interaction 
in the network but what the interaction consists of that matters.  
The network management is seen as having an effect on the level of trust in a governance 
network, and high degrees of trust coming from greater management efforts (Klijn et al., 2011, 
p. 14).  
 
2.4.2 Managerial activity 
“The character of wicked problems requires managers to maintain a wide variety of 
contacts in order to be able to connect with the necessary actors and to acquire 
information and options from them” (Edelenbos et al., 2013, p. 134).  
Adequate network management is vital in achieving valuable outcomes (Edelenbos et al., 2011, 
p. 421). The structure of management activities seems to have an impact on efficiency of the 
network. Edelenbos et al. (2013, p. 131) found that “a strong connective style of network 
management is related to good outcomes”. Edelenbos et al. (2011, p. 427) emphasise that it is 
important that the managers know their networks as the job takes a lot of effort and 
commitment. Subsequently, it can be claimed that “a manager who employs a large number of 
different activities in the governance network will achieve better outcomes” (Edelenbos et al., 
2011, p. 428).  
Edelenbos et al. (2011, p. 422) see the role of the network manager to be a mediator and a 
facilitator where the aim is to bring people into contact with one another, and to build 
relationships among actors in the network. As governance networks often address wicked 
problems, there might be a need for the managers to “maintain a wide variety of contacts in 
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order to be able to connect with the necessary actors and to acquire information and opinions 
from them” (Edelenbos et al., 2011, p. 426).  
Managerial staff seemingly has an effect on the efficiency of the governance networks, with a 
high turnover in managerial staff seen as a negative influence on satisfaction. As trust is seen 
as an important factor for governance network success, and building trustful relations and 
connections is time consuming, a quick turnover over network management can be a hindrance 
to high degrees of trust within the network (Edelenbos et al., 2013, p. 155).  
 
2.4.3 Need for competence 
As claimed by Edelenbos et al. (2011, p. 420), dependency relations are crucial to efficient 
governance networks. This dependency relationship can often be seen as a need for knowledge 
increase. However, Noordegraaf et al. (2017, p. 395) points out that it is “unclear who ranks as 
‘expert’”. One important aspect in the competence increase coming from a governance network 
depends on whether the expert knowledge is recognised by other members (Riche et al., 2020, 
p. 8). In other words, it is important that the members of the network recognise both fellow 
members’ competencies and the expertise drawn into the network from outside.  
 
2.4.4 Goal consensus 
A complicating factor for evaluation of governance networks is that the goals of the network 
tends to be fluid (Klijn et al., 2011, p. 3). A further complication is also that not always the 
member organisations share the same goal, despite often showing similarities. One of the 
reasons for the difficulties in measuring the outcomes of such networks is because of the 
differing goals, making it difficult to pick a goal to measure and assess outcomes of processes 
(Edelenbos et al., 2011, p. 424).  
It has been claimed to be impossible to determine when P/CVE efforts are successful 
(Noordegraaf et al., 2017, p. 397). Thus, determining efficiency of the network membership 




2.4.5 Learning and innovation 
“Learning relies on a balanced configuration of structural characteristics, which means 
that several conditions must be present, but none of them must be overriding. Learning 
is most effective when in governance networks when informal norms offer room for 
creativity and consensus, but also when formal rules control for power imbalances and 
ensure adequate information change. Similarly, a well-adjusted size as well as balanced 
levels of diversity, centralisation, and density seem required” (Riche et al., 2020, p. 12).  
Riche et al. (2020, p. 2) claims that “the success of governance networks depends on individual 
and collective learning”. However, it is not known exactly how this learning is supposed to take 
place. Yet, there are some indications in the literature that when network members are willing 
to listen to alternative viewpoints there can be learning; when there is presence of a skilful 
leader there can be learning; but also a lot of learning depends on individual conditions (Riche 
et al., 2020, p. 9).  
Riche et al. (2020, p. 9) claim that learning is a product of social interaction. Newig et al. (2010, 
p. 6) also correlate with this viewpoint, that information transmission and deliberation foster 
learning. Some studies referred to by Riche et al. (2020, p. 11) indicate that homophily, or the 
similarity of actors, can facilitate learning. Additionally, they found that larger networks lead 
to more diverse ideas and opinions, however, that there is also the risk of increasing transaction 
costs for sharing. Factors such as size of network and network centralisation also makes a 
difference to learning as too large a network can make deliberation complicated and overly 
centralised networks rely on a few heavily linked individuals which can make the network 
vulnerable (Newig et al., 2010, p. 10).  
Another important factor for learning is the degree of centralisation of the network. The higher 
degree of centralisation, the smaller the chances of learning from diverse sources of information 
and peripheral participants. In other words, learning seems to occur only at certain points in the 
network. There seems to be a need for certain amounts of certain characteristics, but not too 
much of anything with the exception of trust. There can never be enough trust (Riche et al., 





A factor that appears for several authors in the governance network field, is the size of the 
governance network. It can be assumed that the more actors there are in a network, the more 
resilient it is due to less vulnerability to loss of members. However, the bigger the network, the 
more complicated it is to engage in deliberation (Newig et al., 2010, p. 10). A large network 
also needs an organisation, or a management, to coordinate all members. Hence, a NAO such 
as the NSC is suitable to larger networks (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 10).  
 
2.4.7 Legitimacy 
An issue for governance networks is that they often are considered a-constitutional, as they are 
often only loosely coupled to democratic institutions. However, it has been argued that 
democratic legitimacy can be realised as citizens, civil society organisations and business have 
more room for direct engagement (Edelenbos et al., 2013, p. 134). Thus, it is important to 
involve the stakeholders in the governance process.  
 
2.4.8 Stakeholder involvement 
The literature claims that stakeholder involvement raises the quality as tackling wicked 
problems benefit from the presence of multiple actors (Klijn et al., 2011, p. 4). This also relates 
to the legitimacy factor as stakeholder involvement raises legitimacy of the network. Some 
authors, like Sørensen (2016) and Torfing and Ansell (2017) claim that network governance is 
not less democratic as it often involves stakeholders on the local level. Thus, being a new form 





3.0 Method and research design 
The chapter will take the reader through considerations and decisions of the research. 
Throughout the chapter strengths and weaknesses of the research design and strategy will be 
discussed. The work on this thesis commenced in January 2021. Through an extensive literature 
review and contact with the NSC, the initial problem statement took shape. I wished to research 
an area where there was little previous knowledge. Thus, seeking missing links in the literature 
review as this precedes any good problem statement (Grønmo, 2016, p. 83). After multiple 
conversations with the executive director of the NSC network, and a literature review that 
showed a grave lack of knowledge on the usefulness of network participation, this ended up as 
the topic of study.  
 
3.1 Research design and research strategy 
This research is a qualitative study, which is beneficial to attain deeper knowledge on a specific 
topic. The reason for the qualitative focus is that I wish to look into how the NSC can facilitate 
members’ capacities in P/CVE issues and to discover this I will need to dig into the tacit 
knowledge and understanding of the informants. This qualitative approach will allow for 
nuances as well as the meanings behind the complex social structurers we find in governance 
networks in relation to RVE issues. The problem statement is phrased as a ‘how’ question, as 
the research seeks to “bring about change, with practical outcomes” (Blaikie & Priest, 2019, p. 
71). There is already some research into what a governance network is, exploring how they can 
be efficient or how these networks can contribute to P/CVE efforts, was an interesting angle for 
this thesis. Also, to bring about change, it is important to examine what works well, in addition 
to what needs improvement. Therefore, a qualitative approach appeared to be the preferred 
design for figuring out how a governance network can facilitate P/CVE capacities. 
This is a research project that uses an abductive logic, which is described as “a mode of 
inference with a defined logical form comparable to induction and deduction, and on the other 
hand as a more fundamental aspect of all perception, of all observation of reality” (Danermark, 
2002, p. 89). In other words, the abductive strategy is somewhere in between the inductive and 
the deductive approach which is relevant for this research as the inductive logic starts by 
collecting data to derive generalisations, whereas the deductive logic tests already existing 
theories (Blaikie & Priest, 2019, p. 21). As this research seeks to utilise previous research 
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through categorising already existing research into the theory chapter as well as gathering new 
data to add to this theory – and derive some form of generality or generalisations from.  
Blaikie and Priest (2019, p. 22) argue that the starting point when using an abductive strategy 
is the world of the social actors and their tacit knowledge being investigated. It is this tacit 
knowledge this research wants to take advantage of and examine. What separates the abductive 
strategy from the inductive and deductive strategies is its way of letting the data lead the rest of 
the research process, as opposed to the problem statements and hypotheses leading the data 
collection. As the research process was all about letting the information from the informants 
guide how the network could or should operate in order to facilitate its members, it was 
important that the data were at the centre of the research. This was also the reason why semi-
structured interviews were chosen. I will return to this in chapter 3.2.1.  
From the outset and throughout the process of completing this thesis, there has been a 
provisional schedule to ensure continual progress. This schedule was only an estimate of a 
timeline that ensured completion by the deadline. Under way the schedule has been modified 
and deviated from as the research changed course. A detailed scheduled was written underway 
to keep track of progress and changes made to the thesis (Appendix A). The research depended 
on the data collection and most of the information left in the final draft of the thesis was made 
after the data was collected. The initial research questions were discarded and the problem 
statement was slightly edited after the data collection. In line with the abductive approach, the 
thesis was modified in accordance with the collected data, and the findings interpreted from a 
continual revision of the problem statement. An outline of the research process can be seen in 
the figure below.  
An advantage with the abductive reasoning is the degree of flexibility and creativity it allows 
for (Danermark, 2002, p. 81). The aim is to recontextualise phenomena into a framework or an 
idea. The end result as a framework for success criteria in a governance network has been 
possible due to abduction’s possibility of creativity and imagination. This has also enabled the 




Figure 2 The research process 
Through the informants in the NSC network there is knowledge on the efficiency of the network 
that is never formalised or written down and passed on. It is this knowledge the thesis seeks to 
grab hold of and write down so that it can be used by all actors and participants of NSC network, 
in addition to other networks and network participants. The aim is not necessarily 
generalisation. However, there is a possibility that the factors reached in the conclusion can also 
be transferrable into similar networks working on wicked problems.  
Danermark (2002, p. 92) argues that abductive conclusions seldom can be seen as true or false. 
Rather that the phenomena can be recontextualised in different ways. This is highly relevant for 
the issues that can be classified as wicked problems. One of their issues is that they are hard to 
define. In other words, how they are defined will affect how they are treated. Consequently, the 





















3.2 Data collection 
As mentioned above, this research is a qualitative study which means that the data collection is 
completed on a selected few respondent in order to understand the depth of how governance 
networks function and how they affect their members’ capacities to tackle societal security 
issues. The problem statement sets out to understand how a governance network can contribute 
to its members’ capacities, thus it is important to know how the members themselves sees the 
network as contributor to their capacities. Hence, the data collection in this research is semi-
structured interviews. Eight interviews were conducted, seven with member cities and one with 
an employee at the secretariat of the NSC.  
This research was quick in selecting units of analysis for interviews; as the network was the 
main object of the study it became natural to interview the members, or participants, of the 
network. This meant that interviews would be conducted with coordinators of P/CVE work in 
various Nordic cities.  
All my interviews were conducted with people that could comment on the microlevel, or on 
their personal experiences, but none could make any generalisations based on formally gathered 
and structured data. As part of this abductive research, an attempt at structuring individuals’ 
experiences into a larger system will create the basis for commenting on the efficiency of the 
NSC network. These interviews were conducted to gather data on the network, the meaning of 
the network for the cities and the efficiency of the network.  
As this research seeks to degrease a knowledge gap in the P/CVE field, it was important that I 
had a sound understanding of both RVE as well as P/CVE. In addition, as the unit of analysis 
was a governance network, I sought information on networks as a form of risk governance. In 
order to set the theoretical framework for the research, I looked for factors that could contribute 
to the success of a governance network. These factors have been drawn from 10 articles on 
governance networks and efficiency through an extensive search on Google Scholar for search 
words like “governance networks and efficiency”, “network governance and efficiency”, and 
“governance networks and success”. The process of selecting these documents have been 
described in the figure below, and the documents included in chapter 2.4 are listed in Appendix 





Figure 3 The process of finding the pillars of success in a governance network 
 
3.2.1 Interviews 
The main source of data for this research has been gathered through semi-structured interviews, 
or conversational interviews. This means that the researcher takes an active role in the interview 
to probe into the knowledge of the informants (Andersen, 2006, pp. 280-281). An interview 
guide was made, and open-ended questions were prepared (see Appendix C and D). The 
interview guide was made with the theoretical framework in mind and sought to explore 
whether the theoretical framework was aligned with the tacit knowledge of the informants or 
whether there were deviations or additions that was not in line with previous knowledge. With 
some main questions on topics I wished to look into, a set of sub-questions were also prepared 
in order to dig deeper into the answers of the informants.  
The interviews were used as a way of finding real world data on previously explained theoretical 
grounds. One interview guide was made for the secretariat informant(Appendix D) and one was 
made for the city informants (Appendix C). The main questions were sent to the informants 
ahead of the interviews in case the informants needed to prepare. However, the full set of 
questions were not sent as I did not wish to let the informants know exactly what topics I wanted 
to probe into. Despite a detailed interview guide, there is always a need for spontaneity to make 
a conversation flow naturally. The researcher needs to be open for new information from the 
informants which can alter the course of the interview (Andersen, 2006, pp. 280-281). In several 
Approx. 
15.000
•Titles were checked and documents that had relevant titles were downloaded.
147
•Abstracts were read from the titles downloaded. 
49
•Articles were considered relevant to read from the abstracts.
10
•Documents were the final number included in the table completed in chapter 2.4. 
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of the interviews I strayed from the interview guide to probe further into details provided by 
the informant. The interview guide was also made with this in mind and opened up for follow-
up questions.  
After several conversations with my contact person at the NSC network, seven cities were 
selected for interviews (out of 20 possible member cities). All seven accepted the invitation to 
participate. These interviews were with P/CVE coordinators in the cities, and the selection was 
made by my contact person at the NSC network, which can be seen as a weakness in this study 
as the selection was not random and not made by the researcher. Yet, the process of reaching 
these cities has been strategic and there has been put some thought into which informants could 
contribute in the best way possible.  
Amongst the selected interviewees are coordinators who have been active in the network both 
for a long, and for a short time; in addition to coordinators who have P/CVE as their main work 
and coordinators who only deal with P/CVE on occasions. This was done to create the best 
width of informants. The interviewees were also coming from all of the five Nordic countries, 
which means I could gather data from all over the Nordics. This approach is supported by 
Grønmo (2016, pp. 103-104), who argue that such a strategic selection can still lead to fruitful 
theoretical generalisations despite there being no method to calculate the size of such a 
selection. A drawback to this argument is, again, that the selection was not done by the 
researcher but the network. Which was also the unit of study. Despite the number of informants 
leading to data saturation, it is important to acknowledge that the results could have been 
otherwise if all members were offered the possibility of being interviewed. It is also important 
to note that all informants work on the strategic level where action plans and strategic 
documents are part of their daily work.  
In addition to the seven city coordinators, an employee at the NSC secretariat was interviewed. 
This was the first interview conducted and aimed to figure out whether there were any 
discrepancies between the secretariat and the cities, and to make sure all knowledge of the 
network was correct on the part of the researcher. This interview provided the researcher with 
information from the networks’ point of view. The informant has also supplied information via 
email correspondence in the aftermath of the interview – either to clarify information from the 
interview, or to add information relevant to the thesis.  
Ahead of the interviews I applied for approval for recording the interviews and collecting of 
personal information at the Norsk Senter for forskningsdata (NSD), which was granted two 
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weeks prior to the interviews. As the informants can potentially identify each other as they all 
cooperate in the same network it was important to get this approval. Still, as much information 
as possible is omitted from the thesis in order to secure anonymity. In addition to this, there was 
also made a consent form that all informants had to sign (Appendix E). This consent form 
ensured awareness of voluntary participation, the ability to edit or change their own quotes and 
their knowledge of the possibility of withdrawing their consent at any point ahead of the 
publishing of the thesis.  
A few interviews into the data collection I felt the point of saturation as most of the informants 
seemed reasonably similar minded, despite smaller differences. However, it was important to 
conduct interviews in all Nordic countries to see if there were differences between the countries. 
A weakness in the research is that there was one informant from four of the Nordic countries, 
whereas there were three informants from Norway. This disproportionate access to Norwegian 
informants could also be a factor for some of the results in this thesis. 
Below are all the informants numbered, with the length of the interview included. Informant 1-
7 are coordinators from the cities that are part of the network, whereas informant 8 is an 
employee of the network and works for the secretariat.  
Informant Date of interview  Duration of interview  
Informant 1  8th March  43 minutes  
Informant 2 10th March  50 minutes  
Informant 3 10th March  33 minutes 
Informant 4 11th March  29 minutes 
Informant 5 11th March  40 minutes 
Informant 6 29th March  27 minutes 
Informant 7  30th March  29 minutes  
Informant 8 5th March  37 minutes 
Table 3 Overview of informants 
 
3.2.1.1 Data reduction and analysis 
By the end of March, all interviews had been conducted, transcribed, and coded in the 
qualitative data analysis programme NVivo. As an abductive approach has been utilised in this 
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research, data analysis has also been completed as a cyclical process throughout the process. It 
is commonplace that data is analysed as they are collected (Grønmo, 2016, p. 265). Hence, data 
reduction and data analysis are not separate processes in the research. Rather, it is the continual 
and gradual clarification of the path forward.  
The transcription was done without adding conversational fillers such as “umm”, “so”, and 
“like”. Transcribing is a time-consuming process. However, having recorded the interviews, 
the transcribing took place after the interviews finished. Despite transcribing from a recording, 
there is no guarantee that the interpretations I made during the transcriptions are one hundred 
per cent in line with what the informants meant. There were also points in time where the sound 
was unclear and I was unsure of certain words. This could contribute to misunderstandings.  
As interviewing is a means of communication that involves thinking on the spot, and sometimes 
the informants would start a sentence with a point in mind and ending up on a totally different 
thought. This means that when I were to use quotes and information from the interviews, I had 
to interpret meaning. This is something we as humans do at all time, but in research it is 
important to be aware of these interpretations. Sometimes we struggle to express ourselves 
orally, and spoken words end up differently as to how we intended them.  
On some occasions I have restructured the sentences from the interviews into better, more 
academic English. To mitigate the weakness with the spoken word as opposed to the written 
word, and with potential mistakes during transcription, I have sent all the informants the 
empirical findings chapter, so that they themselves could read their own quotes, edit or remove 
anything where they felt they expressed themselves incorrectly, or where they feel 
misinterpreted. Thus, being able to edit or rephrase themselves in a more eloquent matter if 
wished. At all time during the process, I have been conscious in interpreting the informants 
with their best intention in mind. It gives the research no added value to play the member cities 
up against the secretariat, but there is still a need to present weaknesses or disagreements. This 
has been done as objectively as possible, although I do recognise that full objectivity with no 
bias is impossible.  
The categories, or codes, are developed throughout the analysis and seek to uncover patterns in 
the data material (Grønmo, 2016, pp. 266-267). This was done through the programme NVivo, 
which is a computer software tool that enables structuring of large quantities of data, both 
qualitative and quantitative. The coding was selected on the basis of findings and provisional 
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themes relating to the research questions. The following nodes were made, and statements were 
coded into these categories:  
Best practice Knowledge hub 
Connections/cooperation Political relevance 
COVID Practical projects/praxis 
Efficiency The role of the network 
Evaluation Time and resources 
Financial matter Why the Nordics 
Table 4 Coding categories 
These categories were part of how I structured the data initially. These provided some common 
topics of what became important during the interviews. Some nodes were more heavily used 
during the analysis and data reduction, as they were closer to answering the problem statement. 
Thus, they were more relevant. However, I did not frantically stick to these categories when 
conducting the analysis. I also had to go back to the interviews and see what questions the 
informants had answered. However, it was a good way of structuring data, and made the process 
of data reduction and analysis smoother and clearer. These were some common trends, or 
topics, that most interviews covered, and coding into these nodes made the analysis more 
structured. In hindsight I also see that the category ‘the role of the network’ became quite large 
and unmanageable and it would have been an advantage to use subcategories for this. I also 
found the COVID-19 category not as useful as I thought I would, which made the node slightly 
redundant. The nodes could also have been coded in the categories for factors for success but 
this was discarded as it would exclude new information and viewpoints that did not fit into 
those categories.  
 
3.2.1.2 Challenges in the interviews 
Due to the outbreak of COVID-19, all interviews were conducted through Microsoft Teams. 
Despite the pandemic making all my interviewees acutely busy, they all set aside time to speak 
to me and to cover all topics necessary. Teams made it possible to conduct seven interviews 
with coordinators from all of the Nordic countries – from Iceland to Finland. Digital interviews 
were to a certain extent an advantage in the sense that most interviews could be conducted 
within one week, despite large geographical distance between interviewees. Interviews through 
Teams also allowed for efficient use of time as this is by now a form of meetings most  of us are 
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used to, so with few technical difficulties all the interviews were conducted. However, a part of 
human communication is body language and gesturing, and this is to a large extent lost in these 
types of communication. Introductions and small talk were also more formal via Teams, thus 
the natural flow that would appear in a physical meeting was slightly hampered. Nevertheless, 
in Teams conversations faces and body language shows, so this was preferable to phone calls.  
One issue that had not been foreseen was related to home offices. As the consent forms for 
participation in the research were sent out (see Appendix ), many replied that they had no access 
to printing or scanning facilities. Thus, unable to sign the consent form. Digital signatures were 
collected, in addition to oral consent at the beginning of every interview to make sure the 
informants understood their rights. Also, two of the interviews had to be rescheduled due to 
unanticipated closings of nurseries, and the need for a corona test. Despite these minor hiccups, 
all interviews were conducted by the end of March.  
All interviews were planned to be conducted in English, as this would make the task of data 
reduction and data analysis swifter for the researcher, one interview was conducted in 
Norwegian, at the request of the informant, in order for the participant to feel comfortable in 
expressing themselves. There is an obvious limitation to the interviews being conducted in our 
second language as the vocabulary and fluency of English would vary. The reason for English 
as the chosen language was partly due to the thesis being written in English and partly because 
it is the language spoken in the network meetings. In addition, this made the vocabulary similar, 
as the cities and countries might translate the concepts differently. Interviews with c ities in 
Finland and Iceland would have to be conducted in English, so the decision to make all 
interviews in English was made for simplicity reasons. A drawback to this approach is that 
some informants might not be able to express themselves as freely as they would have been 
able to do if the interview was conducted in their native languages. I realise that this can be a 
weakness in the data collection and mitigation efforts were made. All informants have been 
able to review all information used from their interviews before thesis submission.  
One major challenge as a researcher is to not ask leading questions. To get honest and real 
answers, it is important to ask open questions and not lead the informants in any way towards 
one or the other direction. Nonetheless, in some of the interviews I actively asked a leading 
question as the informants spoke only of positive aspects of the network. In order to probe 
deeper into the challenges of the network, I asked a leading question to see how the informants 
would respond. This was also to see if there were reflections or willingness to disagree with me 
as a researcher, or to criticise the network. In these questions I found that all informants were 
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able to reflect around or disagree with my statement. This also shows that the power dynamic 
in the interviews were equal and not that the informants were looking to give the answers they 
thought I would appreciate. In addition to this, I also asked leading questions to make sure I 
understood the informant correctly. These were often in sentences like: “So have I understood 
you correct if…”, “…is that what you meant” or “To not misunderstand you…”. This also 
opened up for clarification on the informants’ part.  
 
3.3 Research quality 
The quality of the data material has to be put in context with the problem statement. If the 
material answers these to a high degree, then the quality is good. Hence, the same data material 
could be of high quality in one thesis but of low quality in another, depending on the questions 
the research seeks to answer (Grønmo, 2016, p. 237). For this research I attempted to answer 
the problem statement through questions of how the informants perceived the network, what 
they got from the network, and whether they saw it as an efficient network. These questions 
were asked to see reflections around the value added from being part of the network, or how 
the network could facilitate capacities in P/CVE issues.  
As this thesis is not looking into a field of research that is particularly controversial, and none 
of my informants can be said to be vulnerable, there were few considerations when it came to 
who I could or could not interview. However, when an organisation has opened up channels for 
information and resources, it was important not to abuse the trust given by the NSC network. 
Despite the need for the researcher to remain objective and neutral, some considerations were 
made when looking into the challenges and weaknesses of the network. In some of the meetings 
with the contact person and in sessions hosted by the network, there has been shared information 
that could not be published in the final thesis. This is not because it could harm the network. 
Rather, it is information that cannot be considered public information and is confidential within 
the network. In order to not publish any information that could be seen as confidential, the 
contact person has been able to review all information written about the network before 
submission of the thesis. This will help alleviate ethical conundrums as the network will also 
be able to discuss with me if any information needs removing or editing.  
In addition to the relevance of the data material, other criteria are being used to describe the 
quality of the research. In quantitative research reliability and validity is pretty straight forward. 
In qualitative studies, however, it is not this simple, as for example reliability in the sense of 
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replicability is not seen as possible (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 229). Thus, other concepts have 
been suggested as better measurements of quality, such as trustworthiness5, which is a way to 
test rigor in qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). Johannessen et al. (2011) presents an 
adaptation of the concept of trustworthiness, and it is this I will make use of here. In order to 




Reliability in a qualitative study is high if the data material is credible. This chapter providing 
a detailed description of the research is thus important in showing trustworthiness of the 
material through tracking the data, methods, decisions and the end result (Johannessen et al., 
2011, p. 230). A process description is also added in Appendix A. The interview guides used 
for both interviews with the city informants and the secretariat informant is also added in 
Appendix C and D. However, one issue with the reliability in this and other qualitative studies 
is that open ended questions and semi-structured interviews means that the interview guide has 
not been followed wholly. Certain questions have in some interviews been omitted and in other 
interviews new questions have been asked that were not a part of the interview guide. Thus, the 
reliability in qualitative studies can be problematic to calculate and present (Grønmo, 2016, p. 
248).  
The informants are perceived as honest and through body language and tone of voice are all 
perceived as speaking in a frank and direct manner, thus there is a high degree of trustworthiness 
in the informants. At times informants contradicted the researcher, which shows they were 
speaking from their own viewpoint, and not adopting to a wish of pleasing the researcher.  
 
3.3.2 Credibility 
In qualitative studies, the validity relates to what degree the data and empirical findings reflect 
the aim of the study and represents the reality (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 230). Some authors 
see this as construct validity (Yin, 2018, p. 42). In order to see if the findings represent the 
reality, it is important to know whether the correct operational measures for the concepts have 
 
5 Lincoln and Guba (1986, p. 76-77) see credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as the four 




been established. As mentioned in the conceptual clarification, wicked problems, radicalisation, 
and violent extremism are all concepts that are hard to define and demarcate. Despite the Nordic 
cities being relatively similar in their P/CVE approaches, there is no guarantee that all 
informants have the same view on the issue. As this debate has been ongoing for years, it is not 
one that can be concluded in this research. Thus, I see that there is a weakness in the confusion 
and complexity of the concepts this is concerned with. In addition to these concepts, I make use 
of the term efficiency as a measurement for success in a governance network.  
Despite having defined the concept in the theoretical framework, I do acknowledge the meaning 
of the word is highly diffuse and blurry. Thus, it is important to state clearly in the text how I 
wish to use these concepts as they are inherently low in validity but through conceptual 
clarification (chapter 2.1) and the discussion chapter (chapter 5.0), I wish to mitigate this low 
degree of validity and ensure the reader that the complexity of the constructs and concepts have 
been addressed. However, I do acknowledge that other researchers might define the same 
concepts in many different manners than what have been done in this thesis.   
Throughout the winter and spring, I have also been allowed to attend certain meetings hosted 
by the NSC. These meetings have not been directly contributing to the thesis, but they have 
given me as a researcher a feel of how the network works. This has also allowed me to get to 
know how the NSC work, which has provided me as a researcher a better ground to interpret 
my data. The network has been open in sharing information and details about the network that 
has advantages my thesis, but also information that opens for criticism of the network. This has 
been useful to the research and has opened up possibilities of scrutinising the network and 
looking into details. However, remaining unbiased has been an important aspect of the research, 
which I will return to in chapter 3.3.4.  
It is important that the data and findings reflect the aim of the research and that it presents the 
reality (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 230). Through interviews with city informants, I found the 
informants to be trustworthy and knowledgeable in their field. The informants were honest 
about the challenges they faced in the network, thus indicating that the reality was presented. 
Nevertheless, in qualitative studies one cannot claim to hear the objective truth from informants. 
The answers will always reflect the informants’ viewpoint and experiences. However, as will 
be shown in the discussion chapter, there is a high correlation between theory and the findings 
of this study, suggesting that these findings have also been seen in similar studies.  
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Sending the empirical chapter to the informants is not only done to mitigate misunderstandings, 
it is also done to increase internal validity. In addition, the results were presented to the entire 
secretariat in the aftermath of the interviews. Positive aspects of the network and their 
challenges were here validated as the secretariat also had similar feedback from the cities. This 
shows that the interpretations I make in the results have also been made by others in the 
network. In addition, fellow students from the university course has read and commented on a 
draft, which also suggests a strengthened validity.  
 
3.3.3 Transferability 
Another aspect of research quality is external validity, or the potential of generalising from the 
research (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 230). I believe that the results from this research can be 
transferred to similar governance networks working on wicked problems. This might not mean 
that this research can be generalisable but it could indicate that knowledge from this study can 
be transferred into other networks, or that there is generality (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 231). 
Nevertheless, this qualitative study cannot automatically be generalised to all other governance 
networks working on P/CVE issues.  
The aim of this paper is to see what factors can be seen in network participation in the field of 
P/CVE, and how these can contribute to the network’s efficiency. This is not to say that the 
model cannot be used for networks working on other wicked problems or any other issues. 
However, if it is wished to be used in other fields should be adapted to suit other themes or 
topics. This theoretical generalisation is dependent on systematic discussion of the empirical 
data in conjunction with other research (Grønmo, 2016, p. 285). This has been done in the 
discussion chapter, where previous research on factors for success in governance network is 
seen against the data collected for this research. Here there are correlations which can contribute 
towards a generalisation of successful governance networks. As Danermark (2002, p. 73) states, 
“all science should have generalising claims”. Nonetheless, it is not possible to generalise from 
this research alone as the unit of analysis is one single governance network. More information 
and scientific knowledge is needed in the field before generalisations can be made. Still, some 
generality can be seen as mentioned above.  
The generality of research depends on certain factors such as the success of describing, 
interpreting and explaining in ways useful for other areas than the one in the study (Johannessen 
et al., 2011, p. 231). The pillars in the model for success in a governance network can be 
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transferred to similar networks, such as NAOs. This research is an effort towards creating a 
model of governance networks that creates efficient networks in more wicked problem fields 
than just the RVE field. 
 
3.3.4 Objectivity 
Despite an aim of qualitative research being that a unique and in depth perspective is being 
presented, it is important that the results are not discoloured by the researcher (Johannessen et 
al., 2011, p. 232). As interpretation is an important factor in qualitative research, it is important 
to be aware of one’s own biases and previous experiences in order to mitigate these.  
A consideration important to the researcher was the importance of remaining unbiased 
throughout the process. It would be a lie to say that I wasn’t initially very impressed by the 
professionalism of the network, and it was important that this did not affect my research. 
Remaining critical and reflexive have been a task more complicated than initially thought. I do 
acknowledge that at times it has been a difficult manoeuvre to remain critical of a network that 
appears well organised and structured. Remaining unbiased has been a constant focus.  
Another way of checking for objectivity is through confirmability (Johannessen et al., 2011, p. 
232). As some researchers have presented similar results to the ones found in this study, and I 
to some extent lean on previous research for my model of the pillars of success in a governance 
network, I consider the confirmability to be high. However, as there is a lack of extensive 
research in the fields I am researching, there is a need to validate the findings of this research. 
However, this will have to be the task of another researcher. As mentioned previously, all 
informants have also been able to read the empirical findings chapter and found their views 
reflected in the presentation of the key findings.   
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4.0 Empirical findings 
The empirical findings presented here are structured in the same way as the eight factors for 
success in the theory chapter to highlight the NSC’s convergence, as well as divergence, with 
the theoretical framework. Two pillars have also been added to the model for success as these 
were found to be relevant for the apparent success of the NSC network. The last part of this 
chapter presents key findings on efficiency, as well as empirical data related to whether the 
network is seen as efficient or not – despite the theory arguing that the NSC network should be 
considered an efficient network as the findings in this research align with findings from 
previous studies. In sum, these findings will present data that enables an answer to how 
governance networks facilitate members’ P/CVE capacities. The key findings suggest that these 
ten pillars might bring about an efficient governance network but one element is missing in 
order to know whether a successful governance network equates and efficient one, namely 
evaluations.  
 
4.1 Pillars of success in a governance network 
The theory chapter presented an extensive literature study in order to discover the factors tied 
to successful governance networks. The eight factors seen as important in previous research in 
the field, forms the basis of the argument of whether the NSC should be an efficient network or 
not. From the empirical findings in this thesis I would also like to add two factors that can be 
seen as important, namely tailoring of the membership and membership fee. Several of these 




Part of the reason for the possibility of sharing of challenges and pressing issues as well as best 
practices and success stories could be the high degree of trust that all informants agree on. Upon 
asked the question “Do you trust the information you receive from the network? Information 
from member cities, advisory or any other information sharing”, all informants responded that 
they had a high degree of trust in the network. Informant 3 claimed that:  
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“there is honesty, and I find that both the secretariat and the cities are honest about their 
difficulties which is really great because that is the way to actually learn something. If 
you are willing to lay it all out there and tell your difficulties and challenges. This is the 
most useful and has been more useful than the efforts that are just going really well.”  
Likewise, informant 7 claims that “when the other cities talk, they back up with examples. They 
are putting out peer reviewed papers and other things I would generally trust”. As informant 3 
claims, “I do not know why I should not trust the information I receive from the network”. 
However, informant 2 states “not always. But it is also important to acknowledge just that, and 
I have to go to myself and ask why I do not trust the information… It is important to listen even 
if you do not agree”. Although this does not signify low levels of trust, it is a reflection around 
not agreeing or accepting all information coming from the network. A similar reflection is made 
by informant 6, who states that:  
“I trust the information I receive but I do notice that sometimes there is a silence when 
we are posing some questions. It might be because of the differing job descriptions… If 
I talk about something that does not really fall into the expertise of the other members, 
they might be unable to talk about these sorts of issues. But I do trust the everything I 
get from them. However, I know that sometimes not everything is being said.” 
Despite informant 6 trusting all the information, as opposed to informant 2, there is a clear 
reflection around what is not being said in the conversations. Informant 6 goes on to clarify 
that: 
“The members of the network might present quite a variety of different challenges that 
we are to give opinions or spar on, as we have different job descriptions… the challenge 
is then to give our assistance on something we do not always have the expertise on… 
We do not necessarily have the expertise to fruitfully give answers to these kinds of 
questions” (informant 6).  
As seen above, an honest conversation seemingly takes place in the network but some things 
could be left unspoken due to differences in P/CVE approach or job descriptions. This point is 
not only seen in relation to trust but can also hinder learning as several informants saw the 
sparing that happened between the cities as a productive and direct way of causing impact for 
the members. Nonetheless, when there was a need to contribute to this conversation there were 
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challenges concerning the different roles of P/CVE coordinators in different countries and 
cities. As the coordinators’ roles seemingly varied, it could be difficult to offer useful advice to 
other cities on how to handle certain situations.  
 
4.1.2 Managerial activity 
The NSC secretariat is the network management in this research, and overall, there are clear 
views of the secretariat as beneficial both to network existence but also to the members of the 
cities. The facilitation of contact between the cities was highlighted as an important role of the 
secretariat by both informant 5 and informant 2. Informant 2 tells a story of how the NSC 
network was used to get in touch with other cities with similar issues, and the secretariat was 
used as a facilitator for contact between the cities on a particular issue. In other words, the 
network is a platform to contact other member cities, outside of regular network activities. 
However, informant 7 claimed that they so far had gained the most from the support from the 
secretariat despite the usefulness of the other cities’ experiences.  
A feature of the NSC secretariat, or the network management, was its professionalism. Two of 
the informants, informant 1 and 7, claim that the network has been very professional, as 
informant 7 claims:  
“this network is far more professional than other networks we participate in. It is better 
funded and more staffed and they are good at keeping projects alive and finding new 
ways of interacting, giving out information, create ways of making discussions and 
presenting things.”  
This professionalism has been strived for from the secretariat as they spent six months in 2020 
to map the member cities, what their resources were, the local contexts, how they see 
extremism, and whether this is seen as a big or small problem. Based on this structured mapping 
of the members, the secretariat tailor information and which safe city advisors they connect 
together with cities, as the expert need to have knowledge on the city and the local context, 
according to informant 8. Not only did they tailor information to the member cities, but the 
secretariat also tailored the membership in general, which is seen as a separate factor and will 
thus be elaborated in subchapter 4.1.9. Several informants also stated that the ability for the 
NSC network to see to the local context was one of its strengths. Informant 2 notes that the 
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NSC network focus on helping the cities translate abstract knowledge received from 
conferences and experts into practical knowledge that they can act on.   
As previously mentioned, the formal structure chosen by the network was a conscious decision 
made in 2019 and implemented at the start of 2020. Informant 8 states that this change was 
made to create more value for the members and help them in a better way by being closer to 
their everyday problems and speaking more often. “When we know what they think, what their 
strategies are and where their soft spots and difficulties lie, we are able to work much better 
with them and figure out how and from which cities can help them” (informant 8). From this 
quote we can see that the secretariat seeks a closer cooperation in order to be a more efficient 
network. As the informant notes, the secretariat wish to be what they call “a thinkubator” – 
closer to the issues and be more partners to the cities as this seem to be what works for them.  
Another significant role of the NSC secretariat, in addition to facilitating contact between the 
cities and between cities and experts, is as a trusted colleague. This was mentioned as an aim 
for the network during the interview with informant 8. It was also highlighted by informant 2 
that “they are colleagues”. Informant 5 claimed that it has been easy to get in touch with the 
secretariat, and that “I have been able to call the secretariat to get council on challenges or 
needing to get in touch with cities who face similar issues”. These two informants mentioned 
that this low threshold for getting in touch with the secretariat has been an advantage. The 
secretariat then puts them in contact with a city with a similar issue or a safe city advisor to help 
address the issue.  
Informant 2 claimed that it was a positive trait that the secretariat could carry on with the 
project, even when there was little time in the city to continue:  
“I really appreciate that they can carry some weight when I do not have time because 
we are all up to date in this project. They [the secretariat] have become very important 
to me, and to the work on democracy and P/CVE here”.  
Here we can see that the network functions as someone to rely on. This can especially be seen 
as an advantage in cities with few resources allocated to the P/CVE section of the work. As 
noted by informant 8, the secretariat were highly aware of the time pressure the members 
experienced, this was also acknowledged by the city informants despite informant 5 noting that 
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the network at times demanded of them things they did not see as beneficial, and the ‘city 
portrait’6 required from them was mentioned as an example.  
 
4.1.3 Need for competence 
For many of the informants, the role of the network was also to strengthen city capabilities in 
P/CVE issues. All informants mentioned increasing knowledge on the subjects relevant for the 
network as important. This learning came both from meetings with experts and scientists, and 
also from the practitioners and coordinators in the other Nordic cities. 
“We are building a kind of infrastructure, or library, of knowledge… And we also have 
these 8 safe city advisors who have been in the field for a long time. Whatever the issue 
or question, there is most definitely someone in our organisation who knows something 
about this. So, we go out to find this information and send it back to the city” (Informant 
8).  
Bar one informant, all informants appreciated the use of experts in fields that could increase 
their knowledge on topics related to P/CVE. Informant 7 expressed that there appeared to be 
knowledgeable experts connected to the network as it was claimed that “some of them have 
been to the city and that helps in applying the expertise they are bringing on board our 
situation”. The secretariat was by one informant seen as an important facilitator for contact with 
experts as well:  
“I think they have been good at finding experts… I do not know if I would ask the 
secretariat themselves for expert help on an issue, but I would ask them how they could 
help me… I think they themselves [the secretariat] have a good network to find the right 
people” (Informant 1).  
Not only did experts serve as a way of increasing knowledge, but also as a means of getting 
feedback on cities’ work. Informant 6 points out that, “meeting with outside experts that will 
give us critical feedback on the strategies we are building our P/CVE on is certainly something 
I look forward to”. Similarly, informant 3 said that the network provides good opportunities to 
 
6 The city portrait is an in-depth description of the city, its characteristics, strengths, challenges, strategies, focus 
areas, best practices, and more.  
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get input from and spar with experts in the field, and that this is something they wish more of. 
However, informant 2 shows unappreciativeness to the use of experts and claims that “I have 
already heard these experts and heard what they want to say. Sometimes they expand their 
expertise into areas where they aren’t really experts”. Rather, this informant claim s that a 
positive aspect of the NSC network was a different approach to experts:  
“I appreciated the way the network did workshops and how they made us work. They 
did not just invite experts all the time… I experience that those experts never help us 
translate the expertise into what to do at the local level…. I need experts on local work, 
and I find that in the other cities”. 
The informants had differing views on the use of experts in the network. However, all had 
similar views on the knowledge increase that came with the network, regardless of whether it 
came from the other cities, experts, or the secretariat. Nevertheless, informant 3 states that more 
information, ideas, and toolboxes would be helpful – “it would be nice if someone could 
compile that information into useful products”. This is echoed in the interview with the 
informant 8 as the secretariat are conscious of the hectic schedule of the member cities and 
seeks to be a trusted ally in making P/CVE efforts more manageable. Thus, creating useful 
meaning from the knowledge from the webinars, and translating long reports into 
understandable and practicable terms still has some way to go.  
The importance of the member cities to one another was pointed out by informant 8. All 
informants mentioned that the connection to other member cities and learning from other cities’ 
experiences were a highly valuable part of the network; how the knowledge exchange increased 
the member cities’ competencies. Informant 3 states that “it is primarily a network for sharing 
of knowledge with likeminded cities…it is a place to meet with Nordic cities”. This is also 
echoed in the interview with informant 4, who claims that “it is also a way to meet other cities 
and learn from what they do in this work”. Hence, knowledge exchange and learning from other 
Nordic colleagues is a focus for many of the cities. Informant 3 also mentions that to “naturally 
spar with other cities” was a positive feature of the network. In this sense, the role of the network 
is to take experiences from other Nordic cities and learn from these. 
Learning from other members is an important aspect of the NSC network. Informant 7 voiced 
an interest in learning from other cities’ best practices, as well as to “use what they have learned 
not to do”. Knowledge exchange between member cities appears to have been an important role 
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of the network. Informant 2, 3, 4, and 7 all claimed that experiences from other cities were 
useful in their own P/CVE work. As informant 2 states, “I appreciate sitting with two other 
cities having coffee. It gives me more”.  
A lack of experience when it comes to radicalisation and violent extremist events is also 
mentioned by informant 4 as a reason for the membership:  
“If you want to learn something you have to be in a network with several countries and 
cities, as it [radicalisation and violent extremism] does not happen very often. The last 
year we actually had more cases than we have ever had, so I think it is good to be part 
of a bigger network.” 
This is also echoed by informant 3, who states that “we would really much like the opportunity 
to dive more deeply into initiatives in the other cities and to gain a more thorough understanding 
of how they are put together.” Learning from other cities’ experiences appears to be something 
all informants can agree on being useful. Additionally to seeing learning from others’ 
experiences as an increase in competencies and capacities for the informants themselves, this 
is also interlined to learning and innovation, which will be expanded on in chapter 4.1.5.  
Informant 5 claimed that the raise in competence that came from the network was treasured. 
The role of the network was in many cases to raise knowledge and competency for the people 
involved in the network. This view of the network as a knowledge hub can also be seen by most 
of the informants. For example, informant 4 who claims that gaining “new knowledge and 
learning from other cities’ experiences have been especially valuable”. A goal for the network 
secretariat was to create value for the members, according to informant 8. Implicit in this ‘value 
creation’ is the creation of safer cities. Despite several of the informants stating that the network 
was valuable, what is meant by valuable is not always explicit. 
Informant 1 also claimed that “it has been a confirmation that we are on the right track”. In this 
sense, the role of the network has been to reassure the competency within the cities, where other 
cities had made similar work or where expert knowledge functioned as reassurance for the 




4.1.4 Goal consensus 
The structure of the network is non-hierarchical in the sense that the NSC secretariat does not 
have authority over its members. In other words, the goal of the network will be the same as 
the goal of the cities. Informant 8 was throughout the interview conscious of the fact that the 
secretariat is there to aid the cities, and to help them connect with actors relevant to achieve 
their goals. However, a goal consensus does not equate same measures to reach what the 
findings see as a similar goal. There is variation in P/CVE approach between both countries and 
cities in the network, and despite informant 3 arguing that this was more of a difference between 
smaller and larger cities, informant 6 mentions that the varying job descriptions also posed a 
challenge to the network. Thus, the goal can be similar between all Nordic countries despite 
measures taken to reach the goal being different. This will also be elaborated in subchapter 
4.1.9.  
Despite the goal being similar for the member cities, the means to achieve the goals and the 
challenges within RVE facing the members varied. This makes the dynamic more of a dialogue 
than a monologue, which was also highlighted by informant 2: 
“I see phenomena before they do as I am in the local area and they are not. They are an 
NGO; they do not see everything that happens in the streets because they are not 
connected to the public sector in that way. So, they can be quicker in lifting important 
issues to the other cities because of what I saw here in the city for example. I could ask 
them for help, and they would realise that this is a new challenge or a complex matter 
that maybe other cities also need to work on. It becomes more flesh and blood if we 
work with the network this way, with instant phenomena in our streets, or online. I am 
not afraid to ask for help, so I think we both benefit from working this way. More ad 
hoc.” 
The network operates in a way that makes sense for both the city and the network; they are  
mutually dependent. As seen from this quote, the informant also appreciates the quick 
turnaround that is possible for the network, since the network is not as bound by the 
bureaucracy, as will be explored in section 4.1.7. Thus, also being able to shift focus swiftly 




4.1.5 Learning and innovation 
One of the main roles of the NSC secretariat was to bring forward new knowledge and 
innovation in fields with no existing best practice. One of the aspects several of the informants 
appreciated was to naturally spar with other members and learn from their challenges and 
experiences. As informant 2 notes, “when you go to a conference, listen to a lot of experts, and 
get engaged you might feel that "wow, this is a lot of knowledge" but when you get home you 
get so preoccupied with everything else that the translation part does not sit”. This was a view 
that some of the other informants also echoed, where they saw there were existing networks 
that did not lead to any practical output in the cities. The Strong Cities Network7 was mentioned 
as one of these networks that look good on paper but makes little contribution in reality.  
When asked if the NSC network is sugar coating challenges or mainly discussing the positive 
aspects of their work, all disagreed that the NSC was such a network, or as informant 2 puts it, 
“not compared to other networks, not at all”. Informant 1 reflected on the issue and concluded 
that: 
“It has not just been like ‘it is a great network with great people and expensive dinners’, 
it has not been like that. The network is open to discuss difficult issues, I do not think it 
is just a nice wrapping where things are glorified and sugar coated…there has been some 
depth into it.” 
Informant 3 mirrored this viewpoint by claiming that: 
“I definitely find that the network and the cities are open to share the negative 
experiences as well. Actually, sometimes the challenges are what takes up most of the 
time, which is nice, I think.” 
Informant 5 expressed that there might be more focus on the things that work and share more 
of the good experiences. Despite this, the informant also claims that there have been shared 
challenges and cities have presented issues. Even they themselves had shared challenges as “we 
had some major issues with youth violence and extremism and through the network got tips on 
how to deal with this”. Thus, the statement “I think we bring forward solutions, and are not just 
a talking and debating club” from informant 8 is voiced in various ways by the member cities. 
 




Informant 8 also claimed that the network strives to be a place for both best practices and a 
place where the more pressing issues can be raised:  
“It is not a network where you can come and there are 400 people sitting in the 
conference and you have to brag about something. We try to talk about the difficulties, 
and how to handle these”.  
Hence, there is a conscious effort taking place in not being a network that comes together just 
to tell the success stories but remain focused on delving into the challenges and issues facing 
the Nordic cities. As informant 2 shows: 
“We differ all the time. Not that it becomes hostile but we conclude that we do not see 
the problem that way, or not here…When I listen to the more creative parts of the 
seminars… it is better to do nothing than to do this or that. Prevention is not a 
playground; it is peoples’ lives we are dealing with here…We can be creative but then 
we have to see if this could be harmful in any way…I can see that in all networks, I 
would not say it is a blind spot, but we do not view prevention as science. We can make 
a difference but we have to know what we are doing and what we are trying to tackle.”  
Possibilities for open dialogue and differing viewpoints can also be correlated to high degrees 
of trust and the willingness to be open and vulnerable in addition to this being a prerequisite for 
learning. However, the backfire processes referred to in this quote could make innovation 
difficult in the P/CVE field.   
Despite the overwhelming positive feedback on the sharing of challenges the member cities 
face, one of the informants also understands that it is a network that has to lobby and gain new 
members in order to maintain the business model they are currently using. Thus, it is important 
to also share best practices and success stories as well. Informant 4 acknowledges this by stating 
that “when they started to charge for the membership, there will be commercial interests…They 
want to sell the membership, so they want to make it look good.” Informant 5 also claimed that 
such matters, such as the city portrait (mentioned in chapter 4.1.2) took up too much time and 
did not feel as valuable as other parts of the network. 
The obvious question that had to be raised in the interviews with city informants were their 
motivation behind joining a Nordic network. Why was there a need for the NSC network when 
there are already other European and global networks in the P/CVE field. This question was 
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also seen in light of the theoretical viewpoint that claimed homophily facilitated learning. Five 
of seven city informants stated that they were part of other networks locally, nationally and/or 
internationally. Informant 8 claims that the Nordic welfare system makes the geographical 
scope of the NSC natural, which is echoed by informant 6 who claims that “even if we have 
some differences in our realities and the challenges we face, there are a lot of similarities.” All 
city informants recognised that the Nordic countries have a welfare model that is similar, which 
makes cooperation natural. However, informant 2 and 5 stating that the use of the English 
language in the meetings were a weakness that could lead to some members being more silent 
on matters they have knowledge on than necessary, which could hinder learning. 
Nonetheless, informant 8 emphasises that European P/CVE work differs a lot, and that  for 
example: 
“prevention of extremism in France is quite hard core. It is very in the red zone. It is not 
the same as the approach you have in the Nordics with universal prevention and t rust 
building... That is one of the reasons why the Nordic Safe Cities is needed and why also 
the cities argue that they have chosen the NSC, usually it is similar systems and 
structures.”  
Despite not all informants phrasing themselves in similar matters, they all seem to mention that 
the Nordic welfare model seems to be a good starting point for similar P/CVE approaches. Still, 
informant 5 notes that there have been positive outcomes from other networks they participate 
in, like global ones. An example of an online competition is mentioned as a direct return from 
a global network. 
Even though there are many similarities, there are also minor differences between the countries 
as the Finnish informant sees a lot of similarities in the welfare structure, as also pointed out by 
the employee of the secretariat, whereas the Norwegian informants seem to agree that a separate 
Scandinavian network could make more sense. On the other hand, the Swedish informant 
claims to see similarities with the Finnish approach and that “I am very inspired by Finland. I 
think they have a sound view of society. But I do not see that we are that much alike Norway 
and Denmark either.” When asked about the Nordic cooperation being sensible as opposed to 
a purely Scandinavian approach, the Danish informant claimed to not see more differences in 
conversation with Finland and Iceland but adds that the differences might be more due to size 
of the city.  
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The informant from Iceland sees similarities with the Nordics and claims they have a lot to 
learn from the other Nordic countries that they would not get from a European network or other 
networks. However, this informant also recognises that Iceland is “ten years behind with things 
that happen in the Nordic countries”. Other informants also saw Iceland as the country furthest 
away from their own struggles, and informant 4 said that “sometimes when Iceland talks about 
their challenges, I think that we are so close yet so far away from each other”. Regardless, most 
informants seemingly agree that they have a lot to learn from each other and that the network 
provides exactly this opportunity.  
In other words, the informants see the Nordic cooperation in the P/CVE field as a natural 
extension of how the rest of the Nordic society is governed, despite minor differences between 
the coordinators’ roles in the different cities and countries, as mentioned (chapter 4.1.1). 
However, as the network was born out of the Nordic Council of Ministers, it can be argued to 
be a political decision as much as a natural derivation of the Nordic welfare model. Hence, the 
natural boundaries seen by the city informants, is in reality a political decision which is seen by 
informant 5, who acknowledges the beginning of the network came as a result of the political 
cooperation. This is further elaborated in subchapter 4.1.7.  
 
4.1.6 Size 
One point that informant 5 noted was that the size of the network was good. Two of the 
informants mentioned the Strong Cities network, and informant 5 noted that this network 
dwindled into nothing once it was opened for more members. One of the reasons for this could 
be that a smaller, more exclusive network creates the feeling of ownership. As informant 2 
claims, “we are also part of Strong Cities but that is more a name on a paper”, suggesting that 
the Strong Cities network at least is not an efficient network. Both of these informants felt a 
strong connection to the NSC network, both to the member cities and the secretariat.  
This was also pointed to in the interview with informant 8; That it was not a network with 400 
member cities, and the fact all members had to pay made the network more committing. Internal 
commitment can also be seen in relation to membership fee, which will be examined in chapter 





The NSC network was started based on a decision by the Nordic Council of Ministers. This 
decision was made in 2016, and the network then invited cities to join. As this was a pol itical 
decision made at ministerial level it is seen as a legitimate network. “I think the history with 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, that might be a strength. It gives legitimacy to what we do 
now” (informant 2).  
The Nordic Safe Cities (2021, p. 2) states that the network wants the members to have their 
local politicians on board as they also host conferences for city mayors. For some municipalities 
it is a completely political decision, such as for informant 3. For others it has been a choice to 
make it a political decision to create legitimacy:  
“I could have made the decision on my own because we do have the money in my unit. 
However, I made it a political errand because I wanted to make sure that it was 
known…I made the politicians accept the cost, so that they knew about the network… 
The deputy mayor has become very close because of this project… It seems that the 
work we are doing is interesting for him too” (Informant 2).  
A similar view is also voiced by informant 1, where the network has been:  
“A good way of making the politicians and leaders have focus on these issues and on 
this topic [radicalisation and violent extremism]. When you lift it to this level… I think 
that is really helpful… I think you need to work on prevention on so many levels, 
because if you see it as the part that will make the politicians and leaders prioritise this 
kind of work, I think that is quite efficient… You are dependent on resources and on the 
municipalities’ different services and that they prioritise the issue.”  
Hence, the NSC network is seen as legitimate for its members. However, one challenge with 
this is that things could get done faster, and outside the local democracy. As informant 8 at the 
secretariat mentions that the cities are bound by the bureaucracy and the law, whereas the 
network has more freedom to have open forums as they are not a government institution. 
Informant 2 also highlighted that the network:  
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“can be quicker in lifting important issues… they can move faster as they do not have 
these decision makers in the local democracy that I have to deal with. They can run, 
while I take my steps one at a time.” 
Despite it being a political decision to start the network, the view that it operates on the outskirts 
of the local democracy is seemingly confirmed by the above quote. Nevertheless, changing 
policy is not an aim for the NSC network. The network aids the cities in fulfilling action plans 
and policies already put in place to reach their goals of safer cities. 
 
4.1.8 Stakeholder involvement 
The last factor identified in the literature review of the success of governance networks is 
stakeholder involvement. Five out of seven informants from the member cities mentioned 
practical projects as a positive aspect with the NSC network. A motivation to remain in the 
network for many informants was the “action focus”, as informant 2 stated. Most of the 
informants found this focus to be useful and beneficial. This was echoed by informant 4 who 
stated that the network had direct impact on a project due to feedback from other cities on their 
plan regarding the city park. It was claimed by informant 1 as the Gjensidigestiftelsen’s 
initiative ‘Trygge, norske byer’ contributed to “actually putting projects into life”. Informant 8 
explains that these are projects designed from scratch where they can apply for funding, and 
the network secretariat is providing support for the cities.8 For informant 1 this project was 
concrete and something to work on locally, which made it easier to prioritise and follow up. 
“to get into it with corporations like Gjensidigestiftelsen is a really good idea as you 
actually get some money to do real projects. I think that is a really good idea… the Trygg 
By-project is more concrete and something we are working on locally”.  
Yet, for informant 5 this cooperation with Gjensidigestiftelsen came at the cost of spreading the 
focus of the network too thin. By allowing Gjensidigestiftelsen to decide who got grant requests 
accepted, the cities risked having to tick boxes that were not necessarily directly linked to RVE. 
Therefore, watering down the focal point of the network. In other words, despite practical 
projects being seen as a positive aspect of the network, and something that made the network 
 




stand out from other networks, it was also important for two of the informants that the network 
still focused on radicalisation and violent extremism. This will be further elaborated in the 
following subchapter.  
 
4.1.9 Tailoring of the membership 
In addition to the eight pillars identified in previous research, the empirical findings show other 
factors that were highlighted by informants as important for the network. One of these was the 
secretariat’s ability to tailor memberships. As seen in chapter 4.1.2, the NSC secretariat spent 
time tailoring the memberships in order to offer advice suitable to the local context . The 
municipalities also varied in the usage of the network, as will be shown in this subchapter.  
The role of the NSC for the member cities were in most part similar. The cities seek knowledge, 
competence, and connections to other cities with similar experiences in order to tackle RVE-
related issues. These were common goals for all of the informants. Still, there were some 
differences in the role of the network for the various informants, and they were using the 
network for differing purposes. For some informants it was one of several networks, whereas 
for informant 6 it was one of the most important networks on radicalisation and violent 
extremism. Likewise, there were differences in how the informants made use of the NSC 
network. Two of the informants stated that they used the network for purposes it was not 
intended. Informant 2 claimed to use the secretariat in a case of crisis management and 
informant 3 stated that: 
“We have also connected the secretariat to a specific initiative that we have been 
developing but that was seen as separate from the network participation as it was an 
arrangement made outside of the network. But we have used the secretariat as 
consultants on parts of our initiatives.” 
For informant 4, the NSC network is “a place to get new information and knowledge about 
radicalisation and violent extremism. We meet a lot of professionals in the network and it is 
also a way to meet other cities and learn from their experiences in this work.” This slight 




Informant 8 claimed that the secretariat sees their role as creating value for the cities in t erms 
of prevention work. They see their work as “related to building resilience and capacity” for the 
cities. In essence, there are three areas the network sees as areas that cover their role towards 
the cities:  
1. To connect the cities with one another. 
2. To support the cities with one-on-one counselling to further their projects, as well as 
being colleagues who provide new knowledge. 
3. To bring forward new knowledge and innovation in fields with no existing best practice.  
As the secretariat seeks to tailor experiences to the cities’ varied needs, some of the city 
informants noted that they had given feedback to the network that they feared a watering down 
of topics if the network delved into general crime prevention more, as opposed to staying strictly 
put on P/CVE issues. This fear of spreading the topics too thin has been seen in two of the 
interviews (with informant 1 and 5). Informant 1 noted that in the network:  
“We start to talk too much about crime and crime prevention and stray a bit from 
radicalisation and extremism. I think that may get more cities to join as it is relevant for 
more people, but I think it is good if we can continue to be a network on radicalisation 
and extremism… Rather than letting cities bring on topics that I sometimes find 
irrelevant, I think that it should be a network that should not work on general crime 
prevention because I think we also lose something.”  
Despite the informant understanding the need for keeping the membership rates at a certain 
level, the importance of feeling ownership of the network and not taking in too many members 
was important for informant 5. This informant also noted that certain other networks had grown 
too large, thus lost their importance.  
 
4.1.10 Membership fee 
“There is no time to relax and that might also be part of how the Nordic Safe Cities 
differ. They demand that if you are a member, you should get your money’s worth and 
be active. It is not a passive membership” (Informant 2).  
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Informant 8 gave details of a change in structure leading to the becoming of an NGO as 
described in chapter 2.3. From 2015-2018 the network hosted conferences and camps where 
they had researchers speak about new developments in the field. In 2019 changes were made to 
the organisation, and a new structure was in place by 2020. Now they are working differently, 
with briefings and webinars with updated knowledge. A conscious effort is now put into 
translating long reports and new studies into a useful context for the members.  
There is also increasing possibilities for dialogue where member cities can raise questions that 
the secretariat will gather information on or ask advisors for information on. Part of this 
restructuring also created changes in the funding. The NSC network is currently funded from 
three channels, the Nordic Council of Minister, the membership fee, and partnerships. When 
the membership fee was introduced, the cities had to make a mindful decision of whether to 
spend the money on the membership fee or withdraw from the network. “As with everything 
that costs money, we have to defend why we wanted to be members and that it is worth it” 
(informant 4).  
Informant 1 also mentions that due to the membership fee introduced in 2020, there was a 
discussion of what the city got out of the network, and whether it should be a priority:  
“Even we have tough priorities to make… So when we decide to be part of the network 
or to help a family… If the priorities get tougher, I am not sure what we will do… But 
that will be a political question.” 
However, the informant also acknowledges that the city receives more in return through the 
Trygge, Norske byer project. Thus, making it easier to defend the membership fee. This is also 
voiced by informant 5 who claims that:  
“We get a lot in return for the money we put into the network. I would rather say that 
we get a little too much as my job as a coordinator also includes other tasks, and the 
NSC membership has been very demanding and time-consuming. At the same time, the 
knowledge increase we have gotten from the network is priceless.”  
An element of insecurity for the NSC secretariat is the membership continuation. The 
membership for all of the city informants are up for renewal in 2022. Despite all informants 
showing clear appreciation for the network and the need for the network, membership fees can 
present an issue for the secretariat. In order to remain a relevant governance network in the 
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P/CVE field, maintaining the members or gaining new members is of importance. None of the 
city informants knew for sure whether they would remain in the network. Despite this, all of 
the informants argued that they would like to remain and that they saw the network as beneficial.  
 
4.2 Is the NSC efficient?  
As seen in chapter 4.1, the NSC network appears largely successful as seen by its members. 
Regardless, this part of the empirical findings chapter will examine some of the weaknesses of 
the key findings in order to see how the NSC as a governance network can facilitate its 
members’ capacities to prevent RVE.  
“There is a lot at stake here, and I know that. I have never gone to so many conferences 
as I have on P/CVE issues. Millions of dollars are just pumped into this challenge and 
feeding these middle-aged white men” (informant 2).  
Despite the previously mentioned ten factors seeming relevant for the success, thus the 
efficiency of the NSC network, the data presented some limitations to the claim that the NSC 
is an efficient governance network. Amongst these are the lack of evaluations, both of P/CVE 
measures themselves, but also what the members gain from the network. Despite the city 
informants being positive to the network and all claiming that in some way it was an efficient 
way of managing wicked problems such as radicalisation and violent extremism, there appears 
to be little knowledge on exactly what is received from the NSC network.  
When asked if the informants found the network an efficient way of working on P/CVE efforts, 
six out of seven city informants claimed “I think so, yes” or similar statements. Informant 5 
also added that “especially within the field of extremism we cannot solve anything by 
ourselves”. Similar claims were made by other informants. For example, there was a need for 
the competency that the network offered on the more complex issues, such as wicked problems 
(informant 3). Nevertheless, informant 6 noted that “this network is efficient for me to gather 
information but the question of how I can put this into practice in my city remains”, and 
informant 3 claimed that the network was efficient “to some extent, yes”.  
Since the network is quite new, and 2020 is seen as the first year the network became more 
active and less of an informal network where you passively listen to experts and new 
knowledge, informant 2 noted that “in two years you cannot make miracles” but adds that the 
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practical projects make it somewhat easier to see whether it has made a difference in a shorter 
amount of time.  
 
4.2.1 Evaluations of the Nordic Safe Cities 
Despite most informants agreeing that the network is efficient, there appears to be little 
knowledge of exactly how it is efficient. The empirical findings see a lack of evaluations of the 
network. The NSC network is open to feedback and discussions of what is and is not useful in 
the network. “We get feedback every year on the general assembly in November, so we do an 
assessment of what kind of activities were appreciated, what was not of value, and what to do 
different” was claimed by informant 8. In other words, feedback is offered and informant 5 
stated that the secretariat is open and receptive of criticism.  
This is also voiced by other informants, and despite some weaknesses mentioned by informants, 
such as the network being too time consuming (informant 5), the heavy digital focus due to the 
pandemic (informant 7), and the language causing some members to be more silent than they 
usually would (informant 2), there appears to be consensus that the network is efficient and 
beneficial to the informants. Nevertheless, only one of the city informants had evaluated their 
membership in the network in any way. Informant 6 had carried out an evaluation of their 
membership in the network. This informant claimed that a Strength, Weakness, Opportunities 
and Threats analysis, or SWOT-analysis9, was executed not long ago. Three of the informants 
mentioned informal conversation or discussions with colleagues and other member cities as a 
way of assessing their membership, but as informant 5 contemplates:  
“we have not thoroughly evaluated but we often discuss it with the other cities and assess 
together. Sometimes we agree, sometimes we do not. So, there is a continuous 
assessment but I do not know if I can call it an evaluation. However, it is a continuous 
assessment of the network value.”  
Despite several informants making similar statements on the value of the membership, 
measuring the effectiveness of the NSC network seems to be a difficult task if few to none of 
 
9 For a simple introduction to SWOT analyses, see: https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_05.htm  
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the informants evaluate their membership. However, four of the informants claimed that there 
would be evaluations in the autumn as their membership renewal was at the end of 2021.  
Despite a clear lack of evaluations, an indicator of an efficient network seems from the 
interviews to be whether the member cities take experiences from the network into their own 
work. As informant 3 mentions:  
“to some extent it is an effective forum for exchanging knowledge and experience. 
However, this does not always fit with what is going on in the city…but there have been 
opportunities where we could bring existing issues to the table to discuss or ask for input 
and that has been useful.”  
In this sense, there is a gap between the formal knowledge from the network and the tacit 
knowledge they experience in their work lives on certain parts of the network. However, there 
has been parts of the NSC network that appears more efficient to the coordinators.  
An issue for informant 1 was the inability to use a network to its fullest:  
“I think it has to do with resources but you cannot just sit in many networks at the same 
time as having to work on local issues. I think that might be some of the problem, not 
using the network to its fullest, as the municipality have things to deal with on their own, 
locally.”  
Thus, there is some differences between the informants’ usage of the network and some cities 
use it more actively than others. For instance, informant 7 stated that for their city the main 
support had come from the secretariat, and not the cities in the network. This was due to the 
nature of the project they were undertaking. However, informant 7 was also looking forward to 
getting input from other member cities when, or if, this became an opportunity. Informant 5 on 
the other hand stated that “…they have facilitated. They have also played an important  role as 
they know which cities have similar issues and whom to connect us with”. Two of the 
informants, informant 3 and 4, also note that they do not always make use of the network events, 
as it is not everything that is relevant for their work or their city. Sometimes they select the 
things they see as interesting, thus missing out on certain network opportunities. It was also 
pointed out that there is no time to attend all meetings and seminars on all topics.  
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Notwithstanding some assessments of the network itself, the issue remains unsolved. How can 
the members assess the network’s efficiency? The findings show that there is also a lack of 
evaluations of P/CVE measures. This will be further elaborated in the following subchapter.  
 
4.2.2 How the Nordic Safe Cities have affected praxis 
Throughout the interviews, most of the informants praised the NSC network in some form or 
another. However, in six out of seven interviews the informants were not sure exactly what 
information, input, and changes to praxis the NSC network had contributed to. The last 
informant, informant 7, were receiving specific help and input on how to make an action plan 
for a city that currently had little experience and knowledge on radicalisation and violent 
extremism. As this was a practical process, and also one that the secretariat took part in, it was 
easier to see what input the network (the secretariat and connected safe city advisors) had made.   
Informant 1 points out that “it is difficult to pinpoint what you do, for what reason, and exactly 
where you picked up that knowledge.” Whereas informant 4 claims that “I do not know if we 
can say that it has changed the way we work. Maybe we have, or maybe we have not, I am not 
sure.” Informant 6 claims that “for sure they are affecting our standard of knowledge, and that 
affects the actions taken in our city. But a straight effect on something on a very practical level, 
I am not sure about.” More of the informants agree with this line of thinking. As informant 2 
resonates, “no, it is changing but it is impossible to see if it is the network” to the question of 
whether the NSC has changed P/CVE efforts in the city. Informant 7 echoes this by adding that:  
“Not yet, I do not think… We are really underdeveloped and are trying to gather more 
information… We are real beginners so I do not know if it has changed a lot so far but 
it has definitely made us in the working group more aware and hopefully the network 
will have more effect on us.”  
Notwithstanding lack of examples of how the network has affected praxis, all informants agree 
that the increase in knowledge and competencies is of value to their cities:  
“I think our praxis has not changed on the basis of our membership in the network but 
we have been provided with some good ideas and some areas of focus that we are also 
discussing from time to time and bringing into our efforts. Definitely in the upcoming 
work on writing, or producing, a new action plan in this field… it would be a good idea 
64 
 
to look into other countries and to the network for ideas because that is a point in time 
where network input could influence praxis… And I think that is exactly what we want 
from the network. It is the useful input when developing new initiatives. As well as the 
one on one support” (informant 3).  
Informant 8 states that it is hard for the secretariat to know exactly how the network has 
impacted the member cities, which is also reflected by the informants in the previous 
subchapter. If some cities were to write action plans and reference the network, that is one way 
of seeing direct impact. In many cases, however, the impact is more subtle and not always 
observable. For instance, a knowledge increase within the city does not necessarily make a 
direct difference, but it can alternate how to think about certain activities. This is not always 
measurable. 
The network has made some efforts to build practical projects with the member cities. Here, it 
is easier to measure impact, as it is observable what comes from the network, and what does 
not. As informant 8 puts it: 
“We can help the cities decide how they should design their activities to reach the 
desired outcome… The idea is helping the cities set the right outcomes, the purpose of 
their actions, and set targets that we know based on evidence and competence.”  
The desired outcome might vary from city to city within the network as noted in chapter 4.1.4, 
and this adds to the difficulties of measuring direct impact of the network.  Informant 2 also 
mentioned that they had yet to see positive changes from their project with the NSC. However, 
the informant appeared sure that changes would come from the project and that  impact would 
be seen in a year. Nevertheless, as this was only a prediction made by the informant, there is no 
way of knowing now what effect the project has had in a year.  
A practical project where the NSC ‘network did have direct impact was told by informant 4. 
Through sharing plans for a public park upgrade with other member cities, direct comments 
were made that affected the end result. Changes came as a direct result from input made my 
other members of the network. Similarly, informant 7 also claims that the secretariat has been 
important in providing information, guidance, and support in the creation of an action plan in 
the P/CVE field. Inputs to such projects in cities count toward direct impact from the network, 
both from the member cities and the secretariat. However, for informant 1 the support in the 
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daily work was not from the NSC network, but from other colleagues in the country. Yet, some 
of these cities were also members of the NSC, so there might be possibilities of having met the 
colleagues through the network.  
One challenge with seeing the direct impact of the network is that none of the informants said 
they evaluate their P/CVE measures in a formal and structured manner. Still, five out of seven 
informants claimed that either others in the municipal system evaluated on occasion, or that 
there were informal talks, discussions, and assessments regarding implemented measures. 
Informant 7 claimed not to evaluate P/CVE measures at all in the city, whereas informant 6 
notes that there are other actors in the city who evaluate, such as the police. This is also reflected 
in other interviews, and informant 5 admits that this is something they are not doing despite a 
wish to do so. This informant states that evaluations have taken place through cooperation with 
students and research facilities, but a structured evaluation of all P/CVE measures is not done.   
Informant 2 also notes the lack of evaluations in the department: “it is not my line of 
assignment… and there are other functions better suited”. Also, informant 4 adds that “to 
evaluate prevention is not easy, it is so difficult”. When asked how the city knows the measures 
are effective if they do not measure P/CVE measures, the response was “we do not know if they 
are effective, no.” Informant 8 states that evaluation of P/CVE measures is something the 
network is working on, as they are currently developing a model of evaluations the member 
cities can make use of in their work. It is, though, very clear to all eight informants that 
evaluation of prevention work is complex and complicated.  
Informant 2 noted that, “I realise that in my lifetime I will probably not solve anything but I can 
feel satisfied when I have moved something; I can move a question a centimetre… move the 
question a little bit, just like a little snowball it keeps growing. We take small steps.” This 
informant stated that there was a shift in the way the city looked on P/CVE, and how it has 
shifted from being “against” something to being “positive” to something – the focus was on 
strengthening democracy and inclusiveness, as opposed to fighting radicalisation and violent 
extremism. In this way, there was a shift in prevention work. However, this change cannot be 
ascribed to the NSC network. A similar reflection is made in the interview with informant 5, 
who states that it is important to be proactive and up to date in order to make progress. Here, 




4.2.3 Covid-19 and the network 
As mentioned above, the network receives praise for its ability to share knowledge and increase 
competence within the cities. Despite this, 2020 was a year that changed much for several cities. 
This also involved changes for the network, both the cities and the secretariat. The informant at 
the secretariat, informant 8, said during the interview that: 
“We changed the organisation, where you now had to pay from 2020. We started out 1st 
January 2020 envisioning we should be a network where we met often. We have now 
gotten hundred per cent online… This has also been very much of a change for us and 
a change for the cities in terms of how you operate in a network with digital meetings.”  
Many of the informants from the cities also acknowledged that the Covid-19 pandemic had 
changed the dynamic in the network, and that physical meetings were something to look 
forward to again. Informant 2 claimed that she would much rather sit  down and have a cup of 
coffee with other cities as that gave a lot of constructive input. Other informants recognise that 
the secretariat has put in a tremendous effort in remaining relevant throughout the pandemic 
and adapted to the situation by asking how the Covid-19 pandemic has changed things for the 
Nordic cities: 
“I think I may have learned more from the network during this Corona-year; about 
radicalisation and the impact of a crisis on people, what it does to people, the mistrust 
and difference between the poor and the rich” (Informant 4).  
On the other hand, informant 1 recognised that maybe 2020 was not the right time for the 
network as a more active network in addition to a much higher workload due to the pandemic 
caused the network to become too much. This viewpoint is also mirrored by informant 5, who 
sees that the time and effort spent on network activities and actions might have been too much 
this last year. This informant, however, notes that this is not only due to the pandemic changing 






The purpose of this chapter is to gather all lose threads and discuss the theoretical framework 
against the findings in this research. Where suitable, the literature review and contextual 
clarification will be drawn into the discussion. First, this chapter will examine all factors for a 
successful governance network. In order to see how a governance network can facilitate 
members’ capacities in preventing RVE, I will need to discuss all ten pillars in relation to how 
they facilitate members’ capacities as seen in the empirical findings.  Throughout the research I 
have equated facilitate and increase. I have also equated a successful governance network to an 
efficient one based on indications from previous literature. However, as this discussion will 
show, there are some weaknesses to this approach.  
Despite these ten pillars being important in a governance network’s ability to facilitate P/CVE 
capacities, the research has its limitations - whether these capacities in reality decrease the level 
of RVE in these communities. In other words, these ten factors are not sufficient knowledge on 
whether a governance network is efficient in decreasing RVE prevalence in the societies of the 
member cities. Evaluations of both network value and P/CVE measures are important to 
validate the efficiency of a governance network regardless of how successful its members view 
it.  
Is a governance network efficient as a knowledge hub for its members, and in that sense 
increasing members’ capacities in P/CVE issues? Or is network membership contributing to 
decreasing RVE occurrence in the communities of the members? These are questions this 
discussion will attempt to answer in order to answer the problem statement:  
How can governance networks facilitate members’ capacity to prevent radicalisation and 
violent extremism?  
 
5.1 A model for success in a governance network 
The eight pillars for success in a governance network found in the theory chapter 2.4 has 
throughout the empirical findings shown how they are present in the NSC network. 
Furthermore, two additional pillars for success were added due to key findings in this research. 
Consequently, the new model for success includes ten pillars for success, as opposed to the 
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eight pillars found in previous research. A summary of the key findings can be seen in the table 
below.  
The findings are to a large extent in line with previous research on governance networks and 
wicked problems, in this case P/CVE issues. Despite smaller deviations, which will be 
discussed later, much of the empirical findings in this study validates and verifies research in 
this field.   
Pillars of 
success 
Previous literature Empirical findings 
Trust The higher degree of trust 
the better for the 
governance network. This 
leads to predictable 
interactions and 
possibilities for showing 
vulnerabilities.  
The higher degree of trust the better. 
Spending a lot of time on challenges and 
vulnerabilities were seen as an advantage.  
Managerial 
activity 
A high activity level is 
important, variety of 
contacts needed and acting 
as facilitator is vital.   
Members saw a high activity level and 
appreciated that the secretariat could take 
on some of the project tasks. However, it is 
important to not lay too many tasks onto 
the members. Vital as facilitators.  
Need for 
competence 
Gathering experts and 
scientists, as well as 
stakeholders and 
competencies is important.  
Had a good infrastructure of experts and 
practitioners the members appreciated. 
Knowledge increase that came from the 
network was vital and invaluable.  
Goal consensus Goals tend to be fluid, 
unclear when the goal is 
reached.  
Secretariat tailor experiences to meet the 
goals of the individual members. Goal of 
the network was overarching, but the 
means to reach the goals varied slightly. 
Important to not open up too much as this 
would water down the network.  
Learning and 
innovation 
Individual and collective 
learning is important. 
Individual learning was high. Informants 
stated that they had increased their 
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Deliberation is important, 
and so is the degree of 
diversity or homophily. 
Size and centralisation of 
the network could also 
contribute or hinder 
learning.  
competencies in the field. Deliberation was 
important, also a focus on challenges as the 
trust was high in the network.  
Size A larger network is more 
resilient but the bigger the 
network the more complex 
the interactions.   
A smaller network was appreciated as 
there was a feeling of ownership. Several 
informants mentioned the Strong Cities 
network as a failed network (too big and 
passively listening).  
Legitimacy Often considered a-
constitutional but can also 
connect civil society and 
civil society organisations 
to avoid this.  
Got political legitimacy through the Nordic 
Council of Ministers. Is now an NGO, but 
ties to stakeholders and implementing of 
projects in an effort to engage local 
communities. The NSC actively 
encourages its members to have the local 




raises the quality. This 
also relates to legitimacy.  
Cooperation with stakeholders and 
practical projects mostly seen as an 
advantage but also seen as important to not 
water down the field of the network.  
Tailoring of the 
membership 
Little previous knowledge 
but a variation of 
management efforts seen 
as positive for the 
network.  
Tailoring of the memberships seemingly 
benefit the members as the network can be 
used when needed. This is not only a 
managerial activity, but it is also important 
that other members make themselves 
available to be contacted and provide 
information to other member cities.  
Membership 
fee 
Little previous knowledge 
of benefits. 
The membership fee was seen as a way of 
making the members commit to a certain 
degree of activity. This ensures that the 
70 
 
network maintains a higher activity level 
and that the decision to be parts of the 
network has to be an active decision.  
Table 5 Summary of findings together with the pillars for success in a NAO. 
Summarised in the table above is the findings as they are seen together with the theoretical 
framework. This is of course a simplification of both the theory and the findings, but it does 
suggest that there is significant overlap in the findings of this research and the previously 
existing literature in the field. The two added factors were seen in the empirical findings as 
important for the success of the network as the NSC is largely successful governance network 
as measured by its members.  
As seen in Table 5, the need for the ten pillars of success for a governance network to facilitate 
members’ capacities in the P/CVE field is of significance. It is also important to note that the 
NSC network is a NAO form of governance network, thus, the generality drawn from this 
chapter has to be seen in the context of a NAO structured governance network as seen in the 
theoretical framework (chapter 2.2.2.1). These ten pillars has one major weakness, however; 
there is no knowledge of whether a successful governance network as seen from the ten pillars 
in Table 5 is an efficient governance network as seen in Figure 4 due to a lack of evaluation in 
the P/CVE field. However, this will be discussed in chapter 5.2.   
Despite there not being a possibility of generalisation from this study to all governance 
networks working on wicked problems, some claims to what a model for success contains will 
be presented. The model for success can in some ways be seen as efficient network governance 
in the sense of the definition provided by Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 2). However, as will be 
discussed, the key to increasing P/CVE capabilities is not as simple as the definition presented. 
Limited by only one unit of analysis, and only a limited number of informants, the claim to 
generality is an attempt of moving the debate of how to prevent RVE forward as opposed to 
solving the issue.  
The graphic presentation of the model (figure 4) below consists of the ten pillars of success as 
explained in Table 5. Yet, the model also explains that the ten pillars for success is not sufficient 
for a governance network to be seen as efficient. The ten pillars say something of how a 




This model is a simplification of reality in the sense that P/CVE work is as complex as the RVE 
issues themselves (as seen in chapter 2.1). The model and the ten pillars cannot in any way be 
seen as a solution to the governing of RVE-related risks. The pillars are not a conclusion of 
which factors are necessary for a NAO governance network, and there are possibilities of 
creating this model in several ways. Despite this, it is clear that the model presents an overview 
of the recontextualisation of the theoretical framework in line with the key empirical findings 
from this research. 
The pillars of success can be seen as the basis of an efficient network, but as we shall see in this 
chapter – these pillars are not sufficient for a network to be efficient. These ten factors can say 
something about a governance network’s ability to facilitate P/CVE capacities for the 
coordinators and active participants of the network. However, it cannot say anything of the 
efficiency in relation to the overall goal of the governance network; in this research, safer 
societies in the sense of decreasing prevalence of RVE-related issues.  
 



















































































The theory appears to be confirmed in relation to the claim that trust leads to predictable 
interactions and vulnerability (Edelenbos et al., 2011, p. 436). The empirical findings indicate 
that a large portion of time is spent on issues and challenges. The NSC network spends time on 
discussing vulnerabilities and challenges the cities are facing, as seen in chapter 4.1.5. The 
sharing of challenges and issues was an invaluable part of the network for many of the 
informants, which was also something they learned a lot from. As well as strengthening of trust 
within the network, it also presented an opportunity to learn from others’ experiences. Here we 
can see that a NAO can facilitate members’ capacities through increasing trust in the network. 
With trust comes also other benefits. This research also indicates that trust is important for 
learning as the informants claimed there was learning from listening to other member cities’ 
challenges and vulnerabilities. This argument will be further developed in chapter 5.1.5.  
Another element to the high amounts of trust is one that could be reflected in the Nordic society 
as a whole, as one informant asks why there should not be trust in the network. This could 
simply reflect trust on a societal level, not necessarily related to the NSC network in itself. The 
Nordic P/CVE model also relies on trust between agencies in order to cooperate and work 
together, in addition to the scholarly view of trust-based relationships amongst local actors as 
important in P/CVE work (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016). These are things that could 
contribute towards the high amounts of trust in the network but they could also be hard to 
replicate outside Nordic countries. Regarding generality it might appear that a NAO structure 
of a governance network could only work in societies where trust is already high. The validation 
of trust as important for the network is important as trust is also interconnected to other pillars 
in the model (Table 5). For example, the theory states that the network management has been 
seen as an important source of trust (Klijn et al., 2011, p. 14). This research suggests that there 
is correlation between management efforts and trust, as claimed by Klijn et al. (2011, p. 14). 
From the theory, we can see that trust is important, and that the higher the trust the better it is 
for the governance network. This is also reflected in the empirical findings in this research, 
where there is a high degree of trust. However, what is also seen in the NSC is that parts of the 
tough conversation could be missing. This could be due to the members of the network not 
knowing each other’s job descriptions or it could be due to the language barrier as English is 
the language used in the network but no one’s first language as opposed to a trust issue. 
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However, the findings also state that if there was information an informant did not find 
trustworthy it was still important to listen and reflect why this information was not trusted.  
One of the reasons for this could be that the core mechanisms behind RVE are heavily debated 
and despite some agreement as to what contributes to the phenomena, there is still much 
disagreement in academia and between practitioners (Lid & Heierstad, 2016c, p. 175). The 
cities in the NSC network operate according to their strategies and action plans, and their own 
beliefs in the root causes of RVE. Thus, informant 2’s statement that the city does not see a 
certain problem in that manner, or “not here”, reflects this complexity. Nonetheless, the high 
amounts of trust reported to be in the network arguably benefits other factors in the model for 
success despite trust not being seen as a factor that increases members’ P/CVE capacities in 
itself. Trust is in the findings of this research rather seen as a prerequisite for the beneficial 
conversations. Consequently, trust is needed in a governance network but it is not trust as a 
pillar in itself that facilitates members’ P/CVE capacities.  
 
5.1.2 Managerial activities 
As the theory suggests, there is a need for a network management in the NSC network, and that 
this contributes towards its efficiency. The network was trusted to find the correct experts when 
contacted, it was praised for its efforts to remain active and relevant, and despite one informant 
wanting more of it, they were appreciated for their efforts to translate knowledge into a Nordic 
context to be useful for the member cities. This translation of knowledge appeared to be an 
issue in other networks. Thus, this appears to be an important part of managerial activities. As 
the most important aspect of the network management was the facilitation of contact – both 
between the cities but also between cities and safe city advisors or other partners  – the NSC 
secretariat was appreciated. Previous research from Edelenbos et al. (2011); Edelenbos et al. 
(2013) is consistent with the findings from this study, where the role as facilitator and builder 
of relationships inside and outside the network is of importance to the quality of the network, 
and that a connective style is of importance. Finding the correct knowledge and being capable 
of translating this knowledge into the local context is an important part of creating value for the 
members. Thus, increasing coordinators’ capacities in P/CVE related issues. Translation of 
knowledge into the local context will also be elaborated on in 5.1.5.  
74 
 
Despite previous theory not stating that sharing the workload with the network management 
could be an added benefit of a NAO, the findings suggest that this was beneficial. This implies 
that the greater managerial effort, the more beneficial the network. On the other hand, one 
informant cautioned the secretariat in creating too many tasks for the coordinators. As the 
network has to get funding and potentially new members, it is important to lobby and showcase 
the network. The work relating to lobbying and showcasing the network were tasks that did not 
appear to increase efficiency and view of the network as efficient. Consequently, there is a 
limitation to the tasks a network management can request of the members. However, taking on 
tasks that were previously seen as belonging to the coordinators on the other hand, could create 
progress in a project that would possibly otherwise be on hold until time allowed for progress 
from the coordinators. Despite this creating progress in the projects, it is not intuitively clear 
whether this facilitates members’ capacities in P/CVE issues. It does, however, appear to create 
value for a project with the aim of tackling RVE issues. 
One element of the theoretical framework seemingly relevant in the NSC too, is the managerial 
staff. The findings in this study suggests that the managerial staff is of importance for the 
network. The low threshold for contact reported by the informants suggests that there is a degree 
of informal contact between members and the NSC secretariat. This appears to be a benefit for 
the members as it allows contact on issues not planned for and it allows for aid and help in 
between meetings and webinars (which also relates to tailoring of membership in chapter 5.1.9). 
However, as also suggested in the theory, this leaves the network vulnerable to changes in NSC 
secretariat staff. This poses the question of whether it is the governance network that facilitates 
the members’ capacities, or whether it is just a small group of people driving the network 
forward. Edelenbos et al. (2013) suggests that a change in managerial staff will have a negative 
effect on the NSC. As can be seen in chapter 2.3, the director and deputy director of the NSC 
has been in the network management since its beginning. Thus, there is no way of knowing 
whether the NSC would be vulnerable to a high staff turnover.  
Newig et al. (2010, p. 10) also claims that a few heavy linked individuals could make the 
network vulnerable. This is reflected by one of the informants, who notes that it is the people 
in the secretariat that are doing a good job. Hence, whether a governance network can facilitate 
its members’ capacities in preventive work is not validated by this argument. Rather, it is 
indicating that active individuals within a network can increase P/CVE capacities. This 
discussion will be elaborated in chapter 5.1.5. 
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One part of the managerial activities not mentioned in the theoretical framework is the degree 
of acceptance of criticism. From the findings, it appears that the NSC secretariat is open and 
receptive of criticism and points of improvement. As one informant notes that it is the 
coordinators that are closest to the ground and knows what is happening on the ground level, 
thus it is important that the network is responsive to input and changes presented by the 
members. This also ensures a non-hierarchical structure which also relates to the legitimacy of 
the network. In addition, it could also prevent a high degree of centralisation if all members are 
presenting their perception of the network and the degree of usefulness in their work. On the 
other hand, a large network would potentially not be capable of considering input from all 
members. As seen in the findings, there is already slight disagreement on whether general crime 
prevention should be part of network activities or not. This is elaborated in chapter 5.1.4.  
The network management’s ability to accept changes and inputs does not appear to facilitate 
members’ capacities directly, but similar to trust, it appears to be a factor interlinked to other 
factors that facilitate capacities, such as management activities. The NSC secretariat here are 
seen as validating the theoretical framework on NAOs and managerial activities in the sense 
that it could be argued as an efficient mode of risk governance. Nonetheless, as shall be seen in 
chapter 5.2, the lack of evaluations in the field is the elephant in the room.  
 
5.1.3 Need for competence 
Most of the informants appreciated the experts and safe city advisors that were brought into the 
NSC network during meetings and webinars. However, the findings of this research also raise 
the question of who is allowed to call themselves an expert in a field, as highlighted in the 
theory. As experts can be seen to bring in new knowledge and updated research, it is important 
for a governance network to access experts in the field. However, as seen in chapter 4.1.3, it is 
important that the quality of these experts is acknowledged by the members of the network. 
This could also be related to the decrease of trust in a network if the members cannot relate 
their local contexts to the knowledge provided by the experts. Thus, it is important that the 
network management maintain connections with experts and researchers in the field but it is 
also important that the members recognise the experts as such in order to trust the information, 
thus increasing their capacities in P/CVE work.  
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This also highlights the complexity that is wicked problems and RVE. Chapter 1.1 highlights 
that there are several knowledge gaps and a lot of the information on RVE is disputed (chapter 
2.1.6), which could insinuate that the pooling of knowledge is beneficial only as long as the 
members view the issue at hand similarly. On the other hand, the theoretical framewoek also 
argued that diversity was important for innovation. I will return to this later.  
Despite the apparent appreciation of the level of competence within the NSC network, the 
informants remain unsure of what information and input they actually have brought back into 
their daily work and local communities. Some examples of specific ideas brought back into the 
cities is mentioned but overall, the empirical findings suggest that there is a lack of exact 
knowledge on the contributions of the network. Thus, whether the network is a beneficial one 
to more than the active participants of the NSC. Despite this, several of the informants make 
use of the Strong Cities network as an example of a network they do not see as beneficial, 
suggesting that there is some tacit knowledge of what a beneficial network consists of. Hence, 
it is implicit that the NSC is a beneficial network. Nonetheless, there is no formal evidence of 
the NSC being useful for its members. This will be further discussed in chapter 5.2.  
The need for competence was highlighted by most of the informants, suggesting that there is a 
need for more knowledge on P/CVE issues. This shows a dependency as seen in the theory 
chapter 2.4.3. The informants noted that this knowledge increase was happening in the network. 
The knowledge hub that the NSC was seen as appears to have benefit the members. As one 
informant notes that they would not be capable of doing the work they are doing on their own 
(this discussion will be developed further in chapter 5.2). The findings of this research suggest 
that a governance network being a knowledge hub appreciated by the members could increase 
capabilities. The findings also suggest that the knowledge increase has been a learning 
experience for some of the NSC member cities. For a governance network to contribute to the 
P/CVE field, it is important that the members receive knowledge they would otherwise not be 
able to access as simply as they get access through the network. The pooling of competencies 
and knowledge need to be less costly, both in terms of finances and labour power. This is also 
reflected in the definition of efficient used in chapter 2.2.2. However, lack of evidence implies 




5.1.4 Goal consensus 
The overall aim of the network is to create safer cities, and to work on bringing forward new 
knowledge and innovation in a field with no previous best practice. This goal is on a strategic 
level, and all the informants work on a strategic level in their respective municipalities. The 
findings suggest that the municipalities see themselves as similar in many ways, despite minor 
differences. These differences, however, were ascribed to different sizes of the cities and 
differences in threats facing the countries. The informants saw the Nordic cooperation as natural 
despite the NSC being a political cooperation at the beginning. This research contradicts 
previous theory on the topic and sees smaller differences amongst the member cities but the 
goals of the network are not seen as fluid, as noted by Klijn et al. (2011, p. 3).  
The issue with the goals of the network was not the consensus of wanting safer cities but the 
means of reaching this goal. RVE is highly complex, as seen in the conceptual clarification 
(chapter 2.1.6). The NSC is a non-hierarchical network working to aid the members. The goals 
and aims of the network have been formed by the needs of the members in addition to the 
political will of establishing the NSC network. This could suggest that successful governance 
networks operate towards the same goals. However, the multiple views on root causes of RVE 
could complicate the means to achieve the goals. Consequently, tailoring of membership is 
important (see chapter 4.1.9). It also highlights that assessing the outcome could be a complex 
matter, as noted by Edelenbos et al. (2011).  
As one informant points out, nothing will be solved but if the question is moved one centimetre, 
then the work has been valuable. Thus, the goal consensus appears less significant for members’ 
capacities than the means of operating towards getting closer to the goal. In this sense, goal 
consensus itself does not appear as a significant pillar in increasing members’ P/CVE capacities.  
It does, however, appear relevant to keep the network moving in the same direction. Thus, it is 
interlinked with other important factors.  
The differing views within the organisation of widening the scope of the network to include 
general crime prevention was an issue that could be seen in relation to the root causes of RVE. 
In accordance to the research and literature in the field, this wide scope would be a sensible 
choice in order to facilitate members’ capacities to prevent RVE. This, however, was not wished  
by some of the informant. Opening up would make the network too general and there were 
already parts of the network some informants did not find as relevant as others. There was a 
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fear of watering down topics of conversation within the network. This appears to be a fine line 
to balance. On the one hand, scientific evidence is leaning towards a general crime prevention 
approach on RVE-related issues as a sensible approach despite there being little consensus on 
the root causes of RVE (Lid & Heierstad, 2016a, p. 97), whereas on the other hand this could 
open up the network to more members which could lead to it becoming too large. This was also 
highlighted by using examples of networks which lost their value.  
This is a dilemma for the NSC network that could also be relevant for other networks, and the 
findings in this study makes no clear statement on which approach is preferrable. However, 
there are indications that some of the member wishes to remain a smaller network with a 
narrower field of interest. This dilemma highlights the complexity of P/CVE work. Thus, 
signalling to other governance networks in similar fields that a balance is complicated. On one 
hand, opening up for general crime prevention could lead to increased capabilities in tackling 
RVE-related issues, whereas it could also lead to a large governance network with passive 
listeners and no benefit for its members, as suggested in the findings. This research offers no 
solution to this dilemma, and further research is needed to know how this dilemma should be 
approached.  
  
5.1.5 Learning and innovation 
The lack of data and statistics on RVE issues can be seen as an important reason to join the 
network. As well as being connected to the need for competencies, it is also important for 
learning. In order to attain enough knowledge and competence on the issue it could be argued 
that a network is necessary. A lack of data suggests governance networks are a good way of 
pooling knowledge (Sørensen, 2016). Learning from other cities and coordinators was a clear 
argument in the findings of this research, and potentially the most important reason for being 
part of the network. Despite the language barrier noted as a potential hindrance for learning the 
findings suggest that learning from other cities is beneficial. This information exchange is seen 
as increasing members’ capacities – often through sharing the challenges and vulnerability. 
Subsequently, a governance network can be an efficient mode of risk governance and facilitate 
P/CVE capacities through being a knowledge hub, or a ‘thinkubator’, as the NSC calls it. The 
deliberation needed for learning as seen in the theoretical framework (chapter 2.4.5) has been 
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validated by this research. Thus, deliberation can facilitate members’ capacities through 
possibilities for learning.  
The findings show clear signs that learning has taken place, thus that members’ capacities have 
increased. There is a tendency for the informants to praise the network and the knowledge and 
competence the network brings. The member cities are eager to learn from one another and 
examples of learning from the network were presented. Nonetheless, as mentioned, most of the 
informants also remain unclear of exactly what the network has contributed to, and few 
examples of concrete advice or impact are shown. Thus, an increase in personal competencies 
seemingly is taking place, but it is unsure how this transfer into the local context and whether 
this learning is reflected in P/CVE measures in the member cities. However, as Riche et al. 
(2020, p. 2) states, collective learning must also be in place for there to be success in a 
governance network. What this collective learning entails is uncertain.  
As the Nordic model of P/CVE work is a multiagency approach, does there have to be learning 
in all agencies for there to be collective learning? In which case, there is no evidence of 
collective learning. A grave lack of evaluations of P/CVE measures imply that there is little 
knowledge of the effects of the measures put in place, both as a result of network activity but 
also outside network activity. I will return to this argument in chapter 5.2.  
As the network is reasonably new, and the new structure was only in place just over a year ago, 
it is difficult to measure impact this soon – as pointed out by one of the informants. A weakness 
in this data is that it is not longitudinal. Thus, knowing effects of the network so soon is difficult 
in any organisation, not just in one focusing on a wicked problem. A follow-up study in a few 
years might end up with different results than here, and there might be possibilities of seeing 
learning on a collective level. Nevertheless, collective learning was predicted by informants on 
the practical projects in the network, suggesting facilitation of P/CVE capacities, but this cannot 
be known for sure.  
Some individuals could be argued as important for the NSC network as they have been around 
since the start of the network. As trust is important for learning, and trust is built over time, it 
could be argued that a network with the same few individuals could be the best way of 
governing the risk of RVE. Nevertheless, it can also be seen that this makes the network 
vulnerable. This links to both the theory on managerial activity that says a high turnover in 
managerial staff is a weakness, as well as a high turnover being a hindrance to building trust. 
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Nonetheless, the network is per date set for learning and building capacities, but a centralisation 
of the network could also be argued as a hindrance for sustainable learning.  
The theoretical framework argued that homophily in a NAO could be a facilitation for learning 
(Riche et al., 2020, p. 10). The findings suggest that the theory is confirmed. As one informant 
notes that the differing job descriptions could be a hindrance for giving good advice to 
colleagues, it suggests that homophily would make this conversation easier. The same could be 
said about the language barrier encountered in the NSC. However, as mentioned by the 
secretariat informant, innovation is also an aim for the NSC. Thus, a certain amount of diversity 
in order to come up with new ideas is also necessary (Riche et al., 2020, p. 12). Here, it can be 
argued that due to the similarity of the Nordic countries and their similar P/CVE approach they 
can make use of learning from each other’s failures as well as success stories. However, there 
could also be a possibility of a lack of innovation due to the very same homophily but the results 
of this research cannot conclude on this. Thus, whether homophily in a governance network 
facilitate members’ capacities is highly uncertain despite some indications signalling better 
learning in such networks. On the other hand, if innovation is a goal, some divergence is needed, 
according to the theoretical framework.  
Innovation was one topic that appeared more controversial than others in the P/CVE field. This 
has also been an issue in the scientific knowledge on P/CVE issues. There is little knowledge 
on backfire processes, and as one informant pointed to – it is better doing nothing than certain 
things. This is arguably a sensible viewpoint as we know little about these backfire processes. 
Nonetheless, without evaluating the measures, there will never be knowledge on their effects. 
From the theory it can be seen that creativity is important for learning. Thus, innovating could 
also be argued as important. However, the reasons for occurrence of RVE could be changing 
and adapting to changes in society and keeping up with the newest research and trends within 
the RVE field is an important part of tackling the issue. Hence, innovation could be seen as 
important but it is important to proceed with caution. The lack of evaluations will be discussed 
later. Nonetheless, the theoretical framework appears to be consistent with the empirical 
findings of this study which suggests that learning and innovation facilitate members’ capacities 





The size of a NAO is one factor for success that appears to be interrelated to many of the other 
factors. A larger network hinders deliberation, thus potential learning. A small network could 
consist of a few tightly knit members which makes the network vulnerable. In addition, the 
theoretical framework in this research suggests that the NSC as a NAO is suitable as a larger 
network due to its network management being capable of pulling the strings and keeping the 
network together (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 10). This is in stark contrast with the empirical 
findings in this research. Informants name the Strong Cities network as an example of a network 
that is too large to function well. Rather, the findings suggest that a small to medium sized 
network is large enough to maintain the trust as well as small enough to deliberate. Whether 
this is large enough for the NSC network not to be overly centralised is not certain. In this way, 
a NAO governance network can facilitate its members’ capacities through remaining relatively 
small in size.  
The size in itself appears less relevant for capacity building but important for other factors. 
Also, the size was linked to the feeling of ownership, indicating that this causes a higher activity 
level and better output. Despite the previous theoretical framework not stating that a smaller 
network is related to this argument, there are suggestions that commitment is important for 
efficiency (Peters, 2007, pp. 74-75). This research suggests that size is also related to internal 
commitment, and that a smaller network is better suited to facilitate members’ capacities in 
preventing RVE.  
 
5.1.7 Legitimacy 
One of the issues presented in the theory chapter is the threat to local democracy governance 
networks apparently present, as it in many cases are not defined by constitutions or legal 
framework (Bogason & Zølner, 2007). However, as the NSC was an initiative by the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, it can be argued to be a democratic process behind the creation of the 
network. This seemingly gives the network legitimacy for its members. There is also an aim to 
include the local democracy of the member cities, and the findings show examples of local 
politicians getting involved.  
Nonetheless, the aim of the network is not policy creation. Rather, it is aiding the members 
reach their policy outcomes. It can be argued that NSC participation does not affect the local 
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democracy. This, however, is not as simple as it may appear. The city coordinators have sound 
knowledge of what goes on in their city, and the need for agility and quick changes could be an 
important part of increasing the members’ capacities in P/CVE issues . The findings also suggest 
that the network can operate faster than through the local bureaucracy, and they are not bound 
by the laws in the same way as the city coordinators. 
This signal both potential for being more efficient than traditional channels but also a challenge 
to the local bureaucracy and traditional way of governing. This is, however, in line with Renn’s 
(2008) view of risk governance as an interplay between institutions and NGOs. Still, it is 
important that the governance network operates within the systems and the boundaries of the 
law and local democracy in order to avoid legitimacy issues. The empirical findings of this 
study suggest that involving the local democracy can be one way of including democratic 
institutions whilst at the same time be quicker and more efficient than traditional governmental 
institutions.  
 
5.1.8 Stakeholder involvement 
In addition to raising the legitimacy of a governance network, previous literature claims that 
stakeholder involvement raises the quality of the P/CVE work (Klijn et al., 2011, p. 4). As the 
NSC network was seen as a politically legitimate governance network through inclusion of 
local politicians, it is also important to anchor the network in the local community. Inviting 
stakeholders into the network or its projects has been a way to accomplish this. Practical 
projects carried out through cooperation with Gjensidigestiftelsen is one of the examples of 
involvement of local actors. The focus on practical projects were seen as an asset to the network, 
and despite six out of seven city informants not knowing exactly what the network contributes 
to, these projects were seemingly overlooked when answering the question. In these projects 
there should be a knowledge of exactly what the network has contributed to. However, for this 
to be known, it is important to evaluate. I will return to this in chapter 5.2. Thus, here the NSC 
network through its cooperations affect the local capacities in the P/CVE work. Nevertheless, 
the effects of these projects are uncertain.  
These practical projects mentioned by the informants as an advantage with the network are also 
projects involving stakeholders, and projects relating to the local communities. Thus, it could 
be argued as more local engagement. As mentioned above, several pillars for success contribute 
83 
 
to a facilitation of members’ capacities in P/CVE issues. It  was also mentioned that these factors 
do not necessarily correlate with a decrease in occurrence of RVE. Practical projects were one 
of the issues raised as having an effect in the local communities. Thus, knowing the effect of 
these projects can mitigate this knowledge gap. In other words, projects like this is a way of 
facilitating capacities in prevention work. This could also be a way for the network to attain 
collective learning as the projects are affecting local municipality staff outside the active 
participants of the network. However, it is important to be ware of the backfire processes such 
projects can cause.  
 
5.1.9 Tailoring of the membership 
One aspect of a successful governance network that lacked mention in the previous theoretical 
framework is the need for tailoring of the membership. As seen in the findings, the members of 
the NSC had slightly different needs, and wishes for the use of the network. Thus, tailoring the 
membership to the various needs of the city is an important part of creating a successful 
network. As the members vary slightly in how they tackle the issues faced in the local 
community it is important to avoid a one-size-fits-all model, both in P/CVE measures but also 
in the network approach towards the cities. An important aspect of this is also to make the 
coordinators aware that they can tailor their membership. As seen in the findings, some 
informants claim to use the network for purposes not intended. These purposes are exactly what 
the NSC should be for, as these are the needs of the member cities. In order to facilitate P/CVE 
capacities, it is important that the cities gain knowledge on issues relevant to them. Some 
members might face issues from right-wing extremism, whereas others face challenges from 
Islamic extremism. Thus, as noted in chapter 1.1.1, the cities will need different means of 
tackling the issues as the various forms of RVE are often studied and tackled differently 
(Carlsson, 2017). However, this also makes the managerial activities more complex and labour 
intensive.  
In a non-hierarchical governance network, it is important that all members are aware of this 
option. It is also important that all members make themselves available for contact in situations  
of need from other cities. It could be a member city facing the same issues needing to get in 
touch or a city needing input on certain projects or initiatives. At the same time, it is important 
for the network management to also balance its members’ in the sense that none becomes too 
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demanding, or some not getting enough attention. Retaining balance and only a certain amount 
of centralisation is important for this factor to be beneficial. Thus, tailoring membership to their 
specific needs is a means of facilitating capacities in a manner that in theory should benefit the 
member, as this has been seen as beneficial to the NSC members.  
 
5.1.10 Membership fee 
The last factor that should be added on the basis of the findings in this research is that a 
membership fee appears beneficial. This ensures commitment and involvement in the network. 
The need for a degree of internal commitment in a governance network is also emphasised by 
Peters (2007) in the theoretical framework. As the data covers only seven of the 20 member 
cities, this cannot be said for sure, but the findings indicate that a membership fee creates 
internal debates within the member cities on whether the network is ‘worth the money’. This 
ensures commitment and a conscious decision of staying or leaving the network when 
membership is up for renewal. The findings suggest also that if there is a membership fee, it 
also limits the amounts of networks a city can participate in. Whether this is an advantage or 
disadvantage is not known yet and will need further studies. However, it could indicate that 
large networks with passive members would not survive in the long run. Thus, implying that in 
order to remain a governance network, value needs to be created. In turn, this will facilitate 
members’ P/CVE capacities.  
Nonetheless, a membership fee also ensures that the members can demand more from a network 
than they could if the participation is voluntary. In this sense, it could be a win-win situation 
for both the network and the members. The findings in this research suggests that members are 
themselves aware of what they see as an efficient network or not, and examples like the Strong 
Cities network show that the informants appreciate the approach of the NSC and find this in 
most part beneficial. Although, when transferring into this model of network, members could 
be lost along the way.  
However, one issue with the membership fee where there is still a lack of knowledge is how 
large the membership fee ought to be. Large enough to fully fund the operations of the 
governance network or a symbolic sum in order to ensure activity? Respectively, the network 
management needs to spend time on gathering funding from elsewhere, or the members need 
to make even tougher choices on which networks to be part of. As mentioned by one informant, 
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this is a priority that affects the whole municipality. Nonetheless, despite membership fee 
seemingly causing commitment which in theory suggests efficiency, it remains unclear what 
practical consequences this has for RVE in the local communities. If there is no evidence of a 
safer society or a decrease in radicalised individuals or violent extremists, how a membership 
fee changes anything is unknown.  
 
5.1.11 Summary of factors for success 
What has been shown in the above subchapters is that several of the factors are not themselves 
directly relevant for the members’ capacities. However, it is the interconnectedness between 
these ten factors that appear to be important for a governance network. For example, trust in 
the NAO needs to be in place in order to accept the information presented through the network; 
it is important that the network does not grow too large for trust-based conversations which 
could be a hindrance for learning; or that a membership fee can contribute to internal 
commitment in addition to the size of the network. These examples are just a few of many 
examples of interconnectedness.  
Some of the pillars of success have been seen as more important than others, such as trust being 
the basis of several other factors. In addition, it can be seen that managerial efforts such as 
translating information and knowledge into the local contexts appeared to be significant in order 
to adapt to the various views of the causes and factors for RVE. In this sense, the NSC was seen 
as an efficient NAO governance network. However, simply being an efficient network that 
facilitate the P/CVE capabilities of the coordinators does not necessarily make governance 
networks an efficient means of risk governance. Whether the NSC is an efficient network in 
decreasing the prevalence of RVE or increasing societies’ capabilities of tackling RVE-related 
issues is still unknown. The rest of this discussion chapter will reflect on this issue facing the 
governance networks within fields of wicked problems.  
There is little exact knowledge of what the members take back into their communities from the 
NSC network. As suggested, collective learning is still missing despite beliefs that this will 
happen in the future. Nonetheless, despite several indications that the ten pillars of success is 
important factors in determining the efficiency of a governance network, there also needs to be 
other measurements in place. This will be discussed below.  
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5.2 Success factors = efficient network?  
From the theory chapter we can see that there are certain indicators of a successful network also 
being an efficient one: The findings in this research clearly suggest that the coordinators, and 
members of the network, have increased their knowledge and theoretical competencies within 
RVE-related issues. The findings in this study suggest that a NAO form of organising the 
network could be beneficial. As the informants are overall very pleased and appreciative of the 
network, there are indications as to the NSC network being an optimal model for risk 
governance in the field of RVE in terms of providing its members with a significant knowledge 
increase, a governing method that allows for more agility, and a network that provides learning 
from others’ experiences. 
Arguably the most important part of the network was the knowledge increase that came with 
network participation. This pooling of knowledge allows for the main competencies to remain 
in the network, as opposed to locating expert knowledge in each municipality facing the threat 
of RVE. By any standards, it would be more efficient to organise this in a governance network.  
All informants are stating clearly that they appreciated the information sharing and knowledge 
exchange that took place in the network. This is strongly in line with the theoretical viewpoints 
of what an efficient network is supposed to be (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016; Sørensen, 2016; 
Torfing, 2016). Hence, governance networks appear to be a sensible way of governing complex 
risks such as wicked problems.  
As mentioned above, one informant accidentally paraphrased the definition of efficiency during 
an interview. The claim that they could not do this on their own shows that by this definition 
the network is efficient. This highlights the definition of efficiency used in this research where 
the aim is to create “positive work-level outcomes that could normally not be achieved by 
individual organisational participants acting independently” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 2). By 
this definition the network appears efficient, and as a sensible means of governing the RVE 
risk. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the work is contributing to preventing RVE, simply 
that there are greater efforts being made to attain more knowledge and work more knowledge-
based.  
As seen in the Oxford English Dictionary (2021), the word efficiency means “fitness or power 
to accomplish, or success in accomplishing, the purpose intended.” The purpose intended for 
the network would be to create safer societies and decrease occurrence of RVE. As far as this 
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paper is concerned, there is no knowledge of a decrease in RVE or increased capability of the 
societies to tackle RVE issues, as a result of network participation.  
Thus, there appears to be one major weakness in the previous scholarly knowledge that can also 
be seen in the findings of this study; the members’ appreciate the network and all see a 
knowledge increase but whether this transfers into actually decreasing RVE, or contributes 
towards a safer society is not known.  
The findings in this research show that there is a grave lack of evaluations in the field, and 
despite some actors, such as the police, reporting of evaluations, little is known about the effects 
of P/CVE measures. There is even less knowledge of the backfire processes they lead to. 
Academia shows a large knowledge gap in how local P/CVE efforts affect the local 
communities and the levels of radicalisation. However, this research did also not probe into the 
specific measures implemented in the cities and their evaluations. Thus, this research cannot 
comment on what evaluations have been made and whether the cities have learned from these 
previous evaluations.  
Through the theory chapter we see that a successful network in many ways equals an efficient 
network. However, the findings of this study suggest that this correlation is highly uncertain. 
The findings in this research indicate that the network is efficient in terms of the city 
coordinators attaining knowledge and competence to run their departments. Six out of seven 
informants claim that they see the network as efficient, which provides clear indications of the 
efficiency of the network. In other words, a governance network can facilitate its members’ 
capacities to prevent RVE in a similar way as described above. Nevertheless, six out of seven 
city informants also claim that they were not sure exactly what information, input or changes 
the NSC network had contributed to. This is highly problematic in terms of assessing the 
efficiency of the network. Despite coordinators having increased their capacities, the 
communities show no evidence of a decreased level of RVE as there are no evaluations to show 
for. Thus, the members’ capacities might be increased but the societies’ capacities to tackle 
RVE issues is still unaccounted for.  
If network governance is to be seen as efficient risk governance it is important to know what 
and how the network effect contributes to lowering the risk. Despite the NSC secretariat being 
seen as professional and good at keeping projects alive, as six out of seven city informants are 
unsure of exactly what information, input and changes to the praxis that had come out of 
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network participation there is a cause for concern for governance networks. In order to measure 
efficiency, it is important that the network contribution is known. This also complicates the 
issue further. The findings suggest that few concrete changes have come from the network. 
However, there were some indications of direct impact in addition to practical projects.  
Ultimately, there are indications in the findings of this study that a governance network is an 
efficient way of increasing the competence of the members of the network. Thus, how a 
governance network can facilitate members’ capacities is mentioned in the ten factors for 
success above. Nonetheless, the findings in this research insinuates that this does not necessarily 
have an effect on the degree of safety of a local community or that a governance network at all 
has any effect on levels of RVE. Nevertheless, it is clear that the NSC facilitate the P/CVE 
capacities for the active participants of the network. However, this research provides little 
evidence of a facilitation of capacities in the communities of the member cities. Thus, 
evaluations of P/CVE measures could be able to close the knowledge gap on the real 
contribution of governance networks and could provide evidence of the efficiency of 
governance networks as a mode of risk governance. This is an issue that needs to be solved in 





The aim of this research has been to find an answer to the problem statement:  
How can governance networks facilitate members’ capacity to prevent radicalisation and 
violent extremism?  
This problem statement was made after finding large knowledge gaps in the current research 
on governance network as a mode of doing risk governance in wicked problems, more 
specifically within RVE. The NSC network was the unit of analysis for this research, and this 
network has been used to create some generality on the matter of governance networks and 
efficiency.  
Through eight pillars of success seen in the theoretical framework, the empirical findings of 
this study have to a large extent validated previous research in the field of governance networks 
in P/CVE work. In addition, two new pillars have been added to the model of success in a 
governance network. These ten pillars, or what I have called the pillars of success in a NAO, 
lays the groundwork of creating efficient risk governance in the P/CVE field. The ten factors 
included in this table is trust, managerial activities, need for competencies, goal consensus, 
learning and innovation, size, legitimacy, stakeholder involvement, tailoring of the membership 
and membership fee. These pillars are highly interlinked and complex in their interaction (see 
chapter 5.1.11), which also symbolises the very issues they try to tackle – interlinked, complex 
issues with little acknowledgement of root causes or how to tackle them. The data from this 
research suggests that the pooling of knowledge appears to be an efficient manner of governing 
the risk of RVE.  
However, this research finds few correlations between a successful governance network and an 
efficient one. Despite the NSC network being important in increasing the P/CVE capacities for 
the coordinators active in the network, this research does not find that the work translates into 
a decrease in prevalence of RVE-related issues. In other words, there is little evidence of 
governance networks being an efficient mode of risk governance for RVE-related issues, 
despite some indications that it is a more efficient approach than attempting to tackle the wicked 
problem on their own. A more knowledge-based approach in the P/CVE field is necessary. 
Thus, a model of efficient governance networks was created in order to visualise how the ten 
pillars can facilitate members’ capacities in P/CVE issues as well as seeing what is still missing 
in order to call it an efficient mode of governance, namely evaluations. In conclusion, this study 
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finds that the capacities of the members in the governance network has been facilitated in 
P/CVE issues. However, the communities of the member cities are largely unaccounted for as 
little evaluation of P/CVE measures is taking place.  
Thus, the elephant remains in the room – the NSC can be seen as a successful NAO governance 
network but do these pillars have any effect on the level of radicalisation that occurs in the local 
community? Is there less violent extremism in the societies that are members of the network? 
Indications point towards the answer being no but evaluations of P/CVE work is needed to see 
whether governance networks are in fact efficient. 
 
6.1 Practical implications 
This research has clearly shown that in order to bridge the knowledge gap on efficiency of 
governance network it is important to evaluate P/CVE measures. This is of relevance for the 
academic field, of course, but this is mainly of importance to the practitioners. It is important 
to know that official spending is used effectively, that P/CVE practitioners know the effect of 
the measures and when evaluating measures there could be an increased knowledge on backfire 
processes, which is important for both practitioners as well as the societies as a whole. P/CVE 
work seemingly ‘fumbles in the dark’ to a certain extent. Little exact knowledge about what 
works and what does not work exists, despite recent progress into a more knowledge-based 
approach. It is important for the member cities of the NSC network to know what parts of their 
efforts are worth their time. The communities and societies of the member cities will in turn 
reap the benefits of a more knowledge-based approach in P/CVE work. As this research adds 
an empirical dimension to the knowledge already found in the theoretical framework, there is 
now exists a model for a governance network and how it is suggested organised. Although the 
pillars are many and vague, it offers some indications to other governance networks on similar 
issues in the Nordic countries.  
Although this research cannot be generalised to all NAO governance networks globally, there 
are indications that other issues within the Nordic countries could be tackled in a similar 
manner. One element of this study that could potentially pose as a hindrance to the generality 
of this research is the issue of trust. As raised in the discussion chapter, Nordic societies are 
inherently trusting, thus, this pillar cannot simply be reproduced in all governance networks. 
For some networks, there will be a need to focus on different pillars than showed in the findings 
of this research. Thus, the model of success cannot simply be replicated. Nonetheless, this 
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research also provides the members of the NSC with evidence, or lack thereof, for what their 
network is contributing to. It is a step in the more knowledge-based direction, and a step further 
in knowing what needs improvement for a governance network to be considered efficient. 
Despite efforts of working more knowledge-based, as noted by one of the informants, change 
cannot happen overnight, there is still a large need for further research.   
 
6.2 Theoretical implications and further research 
This research has provided a model for success in a NAO governance network. The model is 
based on previous literature in the field, as well as the key empirical findings from this research. 
Thus, it is important that this model gets tested in other networks. Theoretical knowledge on 
optimal approaches for risk governance should not be underestimated despite this paper clearly 
stating that a one-size-fits-all approach is counterproductive for RVE and other wicked 
problems. As noted in chapter 6.0, one of the issues with the model presented in this paper, is 
that it states something about how successful the members perceive a governance network but 
it provides no evidence. In order to validate this model, it is important to study a governance 
network in the P/CVE field where evaluations do occur. In this way the correlation between 
success and efficiency in a governance network could be validated. This will also allow for 
further practical developments in the field of P/CVE.  
Through this research process, I discovered the need for more knowledge on efficiency in 
P/CVE work. There is little knowledge on what works and what does not, as well as whether 
risk governance through governance networks is an efficient way of organising P/CVE work. 
This thesis has made some indications pointing to governance networks being sensible, but 
there is still much unknown about outcomes of P/CVE efforts. Further research is also needed 
when it comes to the dilemmas presented in this research, such as the dilemma between opening 
up to general crime prevention topics as opposed to a strictly RVE focus. Significantly more 
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January 2021 A thorough literature review was completed to get a grasp of where 
there was a need for more research. Several knowledge gaps were 
found, and the focus area on risk governance in P/CVE issues was 
chosen. This was then narrowed down to look into governance 
networks as a mode of risk governance.  
Several meetings with representatives from the Nordic Safe Cities led 
to the assigning of a contact person from the secretariat.  
A provisional problem statement and research questions were drafted 
to create a clearer path to what data needed to be collected.  
Drafted an introduction chapter to give more clarity into what I was 
looking for and what direction I wanted the research to take.   
February 2021 Theory surrounding governance networks and how to evaluate 
P/CVE measures was located. A draft of the theory chapter was made 
ahead of the interviews as a guideline for the interview guide.  
Edits to the theory chapter regarding evaluation of P/CVE measures 
were made as focus shifted from a goal to write about P/CVE 
measures, to the wish of drafting a model of how to assess the 
efficiency of a governance network.  
Interviews were scheduled and interview guide was set up ahead of 
the interviews.  
March 2021 Completed all interviews during this period. Transcribed the 
interviews in NVivo.  
Began drafting chapter on research design and methods, as the 
interviews went on, I assessed strengths and weaknesses of this 
method as I went along.  
After the interviews had started, the process of coding and data 
reduction commenced. This work was done simultaneously with the 
interviews and in the weeks following the last interviews.  
April 2021 Throughout the month the data has been analysed and written into 
empirical findings. Thus, this chapter took shape during  this month. 
In addition to the empirical results chapter. 
Revision of theory chapter and research methods chapter to edit in or 
out relevant information since data has now been collected, and more 
knowledge on what relevant information consists of, has been 
finalised.  
May 2021 Made edits to all chapters in accordance with updates in the research. 
The theoretical framework was narrowed and irrelevant sections were 
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edited out. The key findings were also highlighted and structured in 
accordance with the theory.  
Completed the discussion chapter. Throughout the month there were 
continuous edits to the conceptual clarification subchapter.  
Made edits to the problem statement and finalised this as well as cut 
out the research questions I had originally intended on using. 
June 2021 June was spent rewriting the empirical findings chapter to structure it 
more clearly according to the theoretical framework. Thus, the 
discussion chapter needed revisions in order to maintain structure.  
The conclusion was written, and so was the acknowledgements 
section. A title was set and formal requirements were checked.  
Finalised all parts of the document. From grammatical revisions to 
visual ones. Ensured all sources were in place at the correct spot and 
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Interview guide Member Cities 
Introduction: small talk, introduce the topic of the study. Ask to record the interview (approx. 
1-3 minutes).  
 
1. What was the motivation behind joining the Nordic Safe Cities network?  
a. What kind of support is your city looking for from the Nordic Safe Cities network?  
b. What is Nordic Safe Cities’ role for your city? 
 
2. How can the Nordic Safe Cities network strengthen your city’s capacity to create safer 
cities?  
a. Have you received this? 
b. How has information sharing and advisory through the Nordic Safe Cities network 
affected praxis in your city?  
c. Is both positive and negative city experiences shared equally?  
d. Have your P/CVE efforts changed since you joined the network? If yes, was this 
because of the network?  
 
3. Is the network an efficient means of supporting your preventive work in the field of 
radicalisation and violent extremism? 
a. Has the Nordic Safe Cities met your city’s expectations of the network? 
b. Is the network seen as an efficient way of aiding your city’s preventative efforts?  
c. Are there any parts of the network you do not find useful?  
 
4. How does your city evaluate measures to prevent radicalisation and violent 
extremism? And does your city evaluate the network participation?  
a. Do you evaluate the process of the measure or the effect of the measure?  
b. If no, why not? How do you know the network’s contribution to the measures?  




5. To what extent do you trust the network? (clarify if necessary: the advisory, the 
experts, the information, competency, and other things the city receives from the 
network) 
a. If high amounts of trust, why? 
b. If little/no trust – why? Why participate in the network? 
 
6. Are you members of/or participate in other networks or network organisations?  
a. Are these more/less connected/better?  
 
7. Are you planning on renewing your membership in the network (in 2022)? 
a. Yes/no question.  
b. If no, what would it take for you to remain a member in the network, or renew 






Interview guide Nordic Safe Cities  
Introduction: Ask if okay to record the interview. Start recording.  
 
1. What is the Nordic Safe Cities’ role towards the cities?  
a. How do you adopt to the varied needs of the cities? Are these needs country-
specific/city-specific?  
b. How frequent is the contact between the cities and the network?  
 
2. Why is there a need for the Nordic Safe Cities network in P/CVE efforts?  
a. Why the Nordic countries? Finland and Iceland have some issues that differ 
from the Scandinavian, why not a Scandinavian approach? 
b. What makes the Nordic Safe Cities different from other similar initiatives?  
c. Why was an organisation model with its own management? (clarify: a formal 
network structure with an independent leadership - as opposed to city 
leadership) 
 
3. How does the Nordic Safe Cities network strengthen the cities’ capacities in P/CVE 
measures?  
a. How does the network stay up to date on the newest research in the field? 
b. How does the network assess which information is passed on to the cities? You 
share best practices, do you also share efforts that had negative, unintended 
consequences?  
c. How much impact does the network have in P/CVE measures the cities 
implement? Or adaptation of already existing measures? 
d. Why is the Nordic safe Cities network important to the member cities? 
e. In your blueprint (Chapter 2) you state that you seek the underlying causes of 
radicalisation and violent extremism – have you found these causes? Are they 
similar in all of the Nordics? If you haven’t found these causes, how do you do 




4. What feedback do you get from the cities on the work the Nordic Safe Cities network 
does?  
a. How do you process/handle negative feedback? 
b. How can the Nordic Safe Cities improve its efforts in aiding the cities?  
c. Has any city left the network?  
 
5. Has the Nordic Safe Cities network evaluated its own capacities in aiding the member 
cities?  
a. How do you know that you are doing a good job in helping member cities?  
b. What are the shortcomings of the network?  
 
6. Does the Nordic Safe Cities evaluate the member cities’ P/CVE measures?  





Participation in research project 
Background and goal 
This research project is a case study of how well networks work in solving wicked problems. 
The case is the Nordic Safe Cities network. I wish to interview member cities to see if there is 
an effect in network participation in tackling radicalisation and violent extremism.  
This research is part of a master thesis at the University of Stavanger, in the master’s 
programme Societal safety. The thesis deadline is on the 15 th June 2021.  
 
What does participation in this study mean? 
Participation in this study involves a semi-structured interview that may take from 30 minutes 
up to one hour to complete. The interview will be recorded and transcribed. Questions will be 
centred around the Nordic Safe Cities network: how participation in the network affects work 
related to prevention of and/or countering radicalisation and violent extremism, and whether 
the city evaluates measures in this field.  
No other data about the participant than given in the interview will be collected.  
 
What will happen with the information? 
All personal information will be treated confidentially and not used in the thesis. The data 
presented in the thesis will not give away the participants identity. Abbreviations of the 
interviewees will not disclose identities of the interviewee.  
The interviews will be recorded transcribed, and the recordings will be deleted after the end of 
the project. The project is finished 15th June 2021. 
If you wish to see the transcription from the interview, remove sections of the interview or 
clear up any misunderstandings, the transcription will be made available for you, and the 
thesis will be sent to you to check for misquotes or misrepresentations.  
 
Voluntary participation 
Participation in the study is voluntary, and you can at any time withdraw your consent without 
stating any reason. If you chose to withdraw the consent, all the data collected from the 
interview will be deleted immediately. There will be no negative consequences if you do not 
want to participate or chose to withdraw from the study.  
At any point in the project will you be able to access the information stored about yourself, 
and the transcription from the interview. At any point will you be able to correct and/or delete 
information about yourself.  
After the project is finished, all information that can identify you will be deleted.  
You have the right to send a complaint to Datatilsynet regarding the treatment of your 





Any information collected in the interview is for the sole purpose of this thesis. The 
information is treated confidentially and in compliance with privacy regulations.  
In addition to myself, my thesis supervisor will also have access to the data. Your name and 
contact information will be stored separately from the data.  
 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me. 
Student Mari Bondevik, +47 95 55 10 52 or m.bondevik@stud.uis.no 
 
Consent 
I have received information about the study, and I hereby give my informed consent: 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Signature of participants, date) 
 
